Perimeter encryption

ABSTRACT

Encryption keys for an enterprise are stored at a perimeter device such as a gateway, and rules are applied at the network perimeter to control whether and how these keys are used for cryptographic processing of communications passing through the perimeter device. The encrypted status of communications, e.g. whether and how files are encrypted with the encryption keys, may also be used to assist in selecting appropriate security handling and routing of the communications.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No.15/429,291, filed Feb. 10, 2017, which claims priority to United KingdomPatent Application No. 1611484.5, filed on Jun. 30, 2016, with theentire contents of each of these applications hereby incorporated hereinby reference.

TECHNICAL FIELD

This application relates to encryption and encryption rules applied atthe perimeter of an enterprise network.

BACKGROUND

Enterprise networks can contain valuable information that forms anincreasingly attractive target for malicious actors. Useful techniquesfor securing endpoints in a network against malicious activity aredescribed by way of example in commonly-owned U.S. patent applicationSer. No. 14/263,955, filed on Apr. 28, 2014, U.S. application Ser. No.14/485,759, filed on Sep. 14, 2014, and U.S. patent application Ser. No.15/042,862 filed on Feb. 12, 2016, each of which is hereby incorporatedby reference in its entirety.

There remains a need for improved endpoint security, particular at theperimeter of enterprise networks, using encryption to prevent dataleakage and other negative consequences for compromised endpoints.

SUMMARY

Encryption keys for an enterprise are stored at a perimeter device suchas a gateway, and rules are applied at the network perimeter to controlwhether and how these keys are used for cryptographic processing ofcommunications passing through the perimeter device. The encryptedstatus of communications, e.g. whether and how files are encrypted withthe encryption keys, may also be used to assist in selecting appropriatesecurity handling and routing of the communications.

In one aspect, a computer program product disclosed herein for managingcommunications through an electronic mail gateway includes computerexecutable code embodied in a non-transitory memory that, when executingon the electronic mail gateway, performs the steps of storing anencryption key on the electronic mail gateway, the encryption keyassociated with users of an enterprise network, receiving an electronicmail communication at the electronic mail gateway, where the electronicmail communication includes an attachment that is encrypted with theencryption key, decrypting the attachment at the electronic mail gatewayto provide a decrypted attachment, performing a security scan on thedecrypted attachment at the electronic mail gateway, and routing theelectronic mail communication from the electronic mail gateway based ona result of the security scan.

Implementations may include one or more of the following features. Theelectronic mail communication may include an inbound communication to arecipient within the enterprise network. The electronic mailcommunication may include an outbound communication to a recipientoutside the enterprise network. Routing may include at least one ofrejecting the electronic mail communication at the electronic mailgateway, rerouting the electronic mail communication to a securerecipient, and forwarding the electronic mail communication without theattachment. The attachment may include at least one of a word processingdocument, a spreadsheet, an image, a video, a presentation document, anda portable document format document.

The computer program product may further include code that performs thesteps of wrapping the decrypted attachment in a portable encryptioncontainer that contains an encrypted instance of the decryptedattachment, an encrypted instance of a decryption key to decrypt theencrypted instance of the decrypted attachment, and program codeproviding a user interface that supports a first mode of decryptionusing remote resources and authentication credentials for a recipient ofthe electronic mail communication and a second mode of decryption basedon local receipt of a password for decrypting the decryption key, andattaching the portable encryption container to the electronic mailcommunication in place of the attachment.

In another aspect, a method disclosed herein includes storing anencryption key on a gateway, receiving a communication at the gateway,where the communication includes an attachment that is encrypted withthe encryption key, decrypting the attachment at the gateway to providea decrypted attachment, performing a security scan on the decryptedattachment at the gateway, and routing the communication from thegateway based on a result of the security scan.

Implementations may include one or more of the following features.Routing may include rejecting the communication at the gateway. Routingmay include rerouting the communication to a secure recipient. Routingmay include forwarding the communication without the attachment. Thecommunication may include a text message. The communication may includean electronic mail message. The attachment may include at least one of aword processing document, a spreadsheet, an image, a video, apresentation document, and a portable document format document. Thegateway may include an electronic mail gateway. The gateway may includean enterprise network gateway that couples an enterprise network to asecond network.

The method may further include wrapping the decrypted attachment in aportable encryption container that contains an encrypted instance of thedecrypted attachment, an encrypted instance of a decryption key todecrypt the encrypted instance of the decrypted attachment, and programcode providing a user interface that supports a first mode of decryptionusing remote resources and authentication credentials for a recipient ofthe communication and a second mode of decryption based on local receiptof a password for decrypting the decryption key. The method may furtherinclude attaching the portable encryption container to the communicationin place of the attachment. The method may also or instead includeconditionally wrapping the attachment according to a security protocolapplicable to a sender of the communication.

In another aspect, there is disclosed herein a gateway including anetwork interface, a memory, and a processor. The processor may beconfigured by computer executable code stored in the memory to performthe steps of storing an encryption key on a gateway, receiving acommunication at the gateway, where the communication includes anattachment that is encrypted with the encryption key, decrypting theattachment at the gateway to provide a decrypted attachment, performinga security scan on the decrypted attachment at the gateway, and routingthe communication from the gateway based on a result of the securityscan. The gateway may include at least one of an electronic mail gatewayand an enterprise network gateway.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES

The foregoing and other objects, features and advantages of the devices,systems, and methods described herein will be apparent from thefollowing description of particular embodiments thereof, as illustratedin the accompanying drawings. The drawings are not necessarily to scale,emphasis instead being placed upon illustrating the principles of thedevices, systems, and methods described herein.

FIG. 1 illustrates an environment for threat management.

FIG. 2 illustrates a computer system.

FIG. 3 illustrates a threat management system.

FIG. 4 illustrates a system for behavioral tracking, coloring, andgeneration of indications of compromise (IOCs).

FIG. 5 illustrates a system for encryption management.

FIG. 6 illustrates a threat management system using heartbeats.

FIG. 7 shows an architecture for endpoint protection in an enterprisenetwork security system.

FIG. 8 shows a method for securing an endpoint.

FIG. 9 shows a method for securing an endpoint.

FIG. 10 shows a system for creating portable encrypted content.

FIG. 11 illustrates a process for unwrapping portable encrypted content.

FIG. 12 illustrates a process for unwrapping portable encrypted content.

FIG. 13 illustrates a process for unwrapping portable encrypted content.

FIG. 14 illustrates a process for unwrapping portable encrypted content.

FIG. 15 shows a flowchart of a process for creating portable encryptedcontent.

FIG. 16 illustrates a method for enhancing perimeter security foroutbound content.

FIG. 17 shows a method for intermediate encryption of potentiallyexposed content.

FIG. 18 shows a method for just-in-time encryption of data.

FIG. 19 shows a method for the use of perimeter encryption to enforcesecurity policies at the perimeter of an enterprise network.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Embodiments will now be described with reference to the accompanyingfigures, in which preferred embodiments are shown. The foregoing may,however, be embodied in many different forms and should not be construedas limited to the illustrated embodiments set forth herein.

All documents mentioned herein are hereby incorporated by reference intheir entirety. References to items in the singular should be understoodto include items in the plural, and vice versa, unless explicitly statedotherwise or clear from the context. Grammatical conjunctions areintended to express any and all disjunctive and conjunctive combinationsof conjoined clauses, sentences, words, and the like, unless otherwisestated or clear from the context. Thus, the term “or” should generallybe understood to mean “and/or” and so forth.

Recitation of ranges of values herein are not intended to be limiting,referring instead individually to any and all values falling within therange, unless otherwise indicated herein, and each separate value withinsuch a range is incorporated into the specification as if it wereindividually recited herein. The words “about,” “approximately,” or thelike, when accompanying a numerical value, are to be construed asindicating a deviation as would be appreciated by one of ordinary skillin the art to operate satisfactorily for an intended purpose. Ranges ofvalues and/or numeric values are provided herein as examples only, anddo not constitute a limitation on the scope of the describedembodiments. The use of any and all examples, or exemplary language(“e.g.,” “such as,” or the like) provided herein, is intended merely tobetter illuminate the embodiments and does not pose a limitation on thescope of the embodiments or the claims. No language in the specificationshould be construed as indicating any unclaimed element as essential tothe practice of the embodiments.

In the following description, it is understood that terms such as“first,” “second,” “third,” “above,” “below,” and the like, are words ofconvenience and are not to be construed as implying a chronologicalorder or otherwise limiting any corresponding element unless expresslystate otherwise.

FIG. 1 illustrates an environment for threat management. Specifically,FIG. 1 depicts a block diagram of a threat management system providingprotection to an enterprise against a plurality of threats—a context inwhich the following techniques may usefully be deployed. One aspectrelates to corporate policy management and implementation through aunified threat management facility 100. As will be explained in moredetail below, a threat management facility 100 may be used to protectcomputer assets from many threats, both computer-generated threats anduser-generated threats. The threat management facility 100 may bemulti-dimensional in that it may be designed to protect corporate assetsfrom a variety of threats and it may be adapted to learn about threatsin one dimension (e.g. worm detection) and apply the knowledge inanother dimension (e.g. spam detection). Policy management is one of thedimensions for which the threat management facility can provide acontrol capability. A corporation or other entity may institute a policythat prevents certain people (e.g. employees, groups of employees, typesof employees, guest of the corporation, etc.) from accessing certaintypes of computer programs. For example, the corporation may elect toprevent its accounting department from using a particular version of aninstant messaging service or all such services. In this example, thepolicy management facility 112 may be used to update the policies of allcorporate computing assets with a proper policy control facility or itmay update a select few. By using the threat management facility 100 tofacilitate the setting, updating and control of such policies thecorporation only needs to be concerned with keeping the threatmanagement facility 100 up to date on such policies. The threatmanagement facility 100 can take care of updating all of the othercorporate computing assets.

It should be understood that the threat management facility 100 mayprovide multiple services, and policy management may be offered as oneof the services. We will now turn to a description of certaincapabilities and components of the threat management system 100.

Over recent years, malware has become a major problem across theInternet 154. From both a technical perspective and a user perspective,the categorization of a specific threat type, whether as virus, worm,spam, phishing exploration, spyware, adware, or the like, is becomingreduced in significance. The threat, no matter how it is categorized,may need to be stopped at various points of a networked computingenvironment, such as one of an enterprise facility 102, including at oneor more laptops, desktops, servers, gateways, communication ports,handheld or mobile devices, firewalls, and the like. Similarly, theremay be less and less benefit to the user in having different solutionsfor known and unknown threats. As such, a consolidated threat managementfacility 100 may need to apply a similar set of technologies andcapabilities for all threats. In certain embodiments, the threatmanagement facility 100 may provide a single agent on the desktop, and asingle scan of any suspect file. This approach may eliminate theinevitable overlaps and gaps in protection caused by treating virusesand spyware as separate problems, while simultaneously simplifyingadministration and minimizing desktop load. As the number and range oftypes of threats has increased, so may have the level of connectivityavailable to all IT users. This may have led to a rapid increase in thespeed at which threats may move. Today, an unprotected PC connected tothe Internet 154 may be infected quickly (perhaps within 10 minutes)which may require acceleration for the delivery of threat protection.Where once monthly updates may have been sufficient, the threatmanagement facility 100 may automatically and seamlessly update itsproduct set against spam and virus threats quickly, for instance, everyfive minutes, every minute, continuously, or the like. Analysis andtesting may be increasingly automated, and also may be performed morefrequently; for instance, it may be completed in 15 minutes, and may doso without compromising quality. The threat management facility 100 mayalso extend techniques that may have been developed for virus andmalware protection, and provide them to enterprise facility 102 networkadministrators to better control their environments. In addition tostopping malicious code, the threat management facility 100 may providepolicy management that may be able to control legitimate applications,such as VoIP, instant messaging, peer-to-peer file-sharing, and thelike, that may undermine productivity and network performance within theenterprise facility 102.

The threat management facility 100 may provide an enterprise facility102 protection from computer-based malware, including viruses, spyware,adware, Trojans, intrusion, spam, policy abuse, uncontrolled access, andthe like, where the enterprise facility 102 may be any entity with anetworked computer-based infrastructure. In an embodiment, FIG. 1 maydepict a block diagram of the threat management facility 100 providingprotection to an enterprise against a plurality of threats. Theenterprise facility 102 may be corporate, commercial, educational,governmental, or the like, and the enterprise facility's 102 computernetwork may be distributed amongst a plurality of facilities, and in aplurality of geographical locations, and may include administration 134,a firewall 138A, an appliance 140A, server 142A, network devices 148A-B,clients 144A-D, such as protected by computer security facilities 152,and the like. It will be understood that any reference herein to clientfacilities may include the clients 144A-D shown in FIG. 1 andvice-versa. The threat management facility 100 may include a pluralityof functions, such as security management facility 122, policymanagement facility 112, update facility 120, definitions facility 114,network access rules facility 124, remedial action facility 128,detection techniques facility 130, testing facility 118, threat researchfacility 132, and the like. In embodiments, the threat protectionprovided by the threat management facility 100 may extend beyond thenetwork boundaries of the enterprise facility 102 to include clients144D (or client facilities) that have moved into network connectivitynot directly associated or controlled by the enterprise facility 102.Threats to client facilities may come from a plurality of sources, suchas from network threats 104, physical proximity threats 110, secondarylocation threats 108, and the like. Clients 144A-D may be protected fromthreats even when the client 144A-D is not located in association withthe enterprise 102, such as when a client 144E-F moves in and out of theenterprise facility 102, for example when interfacing with anunprotected server 142C through the Internet 154, when a client 144F ismoving into a secondary location threat 108 such as interfacing withcomponents 140B, 142B, 148C, 148D that are not protected, and the like.In embodiments, the threat management facility 100 may provide anenterprise facility 102 protection from a plurality of threats tomultiplatform computer resources in a plurality of locations and networkconfigurations, with an integrated system approach. It should beunderstood that an enterprise model is applicable to organizations andusers of any size or type. For example, an enterprise may be or mayinclude a group or association of endpoints, networks, users, and thelike within or outside of one or more protected locations. It should beunderstood that an enterprise may include one or more offices orbusiness locations, or one or more homes, where each location, orportions of each location, or a collection of locations may be treatedas a client facility.

In embodiments, the threat management facility 100 may be provided as astand-alone solution. In other embodiments, the threat managementfacility 100 may be integrated into a third-party product. Anapplication programming interface (e.g. a source code interface) may beprovided such that the threat management facility 100 may be integrated.For instance, the threat management facility 100 may be stand-alone inthat it provides direct threat protection to an enterprise or computerresource, where protection is subscribed to directly 100. Alternatively,the threat management facility 100 may offer protection indirectly,through a third-party product, where an enterprise may subscribe toservices through the third-party product, and threat protection to theenterprise may be provided by the threat management facility 100 throughthe third-party product.

The security management facility 122 may include a plurality of elementsthat provide protection from malware to enterprise facility 102 computerresources, including endpoint security and control, email security andcontrol, web security and control, reputation-based filtering, controlof unauthorized users, control of guest and non-compliant computers, andthe like. The security management facility 122 may be a softwareapplication that may provide malicious code and malicious applicationprotection to a client facility computing resource. The securitymanagement facility 122 may have the ability to scan the client facilityfiles for malicious code, remove or quarantine certain applications andfiles, prevent certain actions, perform remedial actions and performother security measures. In embodiments, scanning the client facilitymay include scanning some or all of the files stored to the clientfacility on a periodic basis, scanning an application when theapplication is executed, scanning files as the files are transmitted toor from the client facility, or the like. The scanning of theapplications and files may be performed to detect known malicious codeor known unwanted applications. In an embodiment, new malicious code andunwanted applications may be continually developed and distributed, andupdates to the known code database may be provided on a periodic basis,on a demand basis, on an alert basis, or the like.

The security management facility 122 may provide email security andcontrol, where security management may help to eliminate spam, viruses,spyware and phishing, control of email content, and the like. Thesecurity management facility's 122 email security and control mayprotect against inbound and outbound threats, protect emailinfrastructure, prevent data leakage, provide spam filtering, and thelike. In an embodiment, security management facility 122 may provide forweb security and control, where security management may help to detector block viruses, spyware, malware, unwanted applications, help controlweb browsing, and the like, which may provide comprehensive web accesscontrol enabling safe, productive web browsing. Web security and controlmay provide Internet use policies, reporting on suspect devices,security and content filtering, active monitoring of network traffic,URI filtering, and the like. In an embodiment, the security managementfacility 122 may provide for network access control, which may providecontrol over network connections. Network control may stop unauthorized,guest, or non-compliant systems from accessing networks, and may controlnetwork traffic that may not be bypassed from the client level. Inaddition, network access control may control access to virtual privatenetworks (VPN), where VPNs may be a communications network tunneledthrough another network, establishing a logical connection acting as avirtual network. In embodiments, a VPN may be treated in the same manneras a physical network.

The security management facility 122 may provide host intrusionprevention through behavioral based protection, which may guard againstunknown threats by analyzing behavior before software code executes.Behavioral based protection may monitor code when it runs and interveneif the code is deemed to be suspicious or malicious. Advantages ofbehavioral based protection over runtime protection may include codebeing prevented from running. Whereas runtime protection may onlyinterrupt code that has already partly executed, behavioral protectioncan identify malicious code at the gateway or on the file servers anddelete the code before it can reach endpoint computers and the like.

The security management facility 122 may provide reputation filtering,which may target or identify sources of known malware. For instance,reputation filtering may include lists of URIs of known sources ofmalware or known suspicious IP addresses, or domains, say for spam, thatwhen detected may invoke an action by the threat management facility100, such as dropping them immediately. By dropping the source beforeany interaction can initiate, potential threat sources may be thwartedbefore any exchange of data can be made.

In embodiments, information may be sent from the enterprise back to athird party, a vendor, or the like, which may lead to improvedperformance of the threat management facility 100. For example, thetypes, times, and number of virus interactions that a client experiencesmay provide useful information for the preventions of future virusthreats. This type of feedback may be useful for any aspect of threatdetection. Feedback of information may also be associated with behaviorsof individuals within the enterprise, such as being associated with mostcommon violations of policy, network access, unauthorized applicationloading, unauthorized external device use, and the like. In embodiments,this type of information feedback may enable the evaluation or profilingof client actions that are violations of policy that may provide apredictive model for the improvement of enterprise policies.

The security management facility 122 may support overall security of theenterprise facility 102 network or set of enterprise facility 102networks, e.g., by providing updates of malicious code information tothe enterprise facility 102 network and associated client facilities.The updates may include a planned update, an update in reaction to athreat notice, an update in reaction to a request for an update, anupdate based on a search of known malicious code information, or thelike. The administration facility 134 may provide control over thesecurity management facility 122 when updates are performed. The updatesmay be automatically transmitted without an administration facility's134 direct control, manually transmitted by the administration facility134, or otherwise distributed. The security management facility 122 maymanage the receipt of malicious code descriptions from a provider,distribution of the malicious code descriptions to enterprise facility102 networks, distribution of the malicious code descriptions to clientfacilities, and so forth.

The threat management facility 100 may provide a policy managementfacility 112 that may be able to block non-malicious applications, suchas VoIP, instant messaging, peer-to-peer file-sharing, and the like,that may undermine productivity and network performance within theenterprise facility 102. The policy management facility 112 may be a setof rules or policies that may indicate enterprise facility 102 accesspermissions for the client facility, such as access permissionsassociated with the network, applications, external computer devices,and the like. The policy management facility 112 may include a database,a text file, a combination of databases and text files, or the like. Inan embodiment, a policy database may be a block list, a black list, anallowed list, a white list, or the like that may provide a list ofenterprise facility 102 external network locations/applications that mayor may not be accessed by the client facility. The policy managementfacility 112 may include rules that may be interpreted with respect toan enterprise facility 102 network access request to determine if therequest should be allowed. The rules may provide a generic rule for thetype of access that may be granted. The rules may be related to thepolicies of an enterprise facility 102 for access rights for theenterprise facility's 102 client facility. For example, there may be arule that does not permit access to sporting websites. When a website isrequested by the client facility, a security facility may access therules within a policy facility to determine if the requested access isrelated to a sporting website. In an embodiment, the security facilitymay analyze the requested website to determine if the website matcheswith any of the policy facility rules.

The policy management facility 112 may be similar to the securitymanagement facility 122 but with the addition of enterprise facility 102wide access rules and policies that may be distributed to maintaincontrol of client facility access to enterprise facility 102 networkresources. The policies may be defined for application type, subset ofapplication capabilities, organization hierarchy, computer facilitytype, user type, network location, time of day, connection type, or thelike. Policies may be maintained by the administration facility 134,through the threat management facility 100, in association with a thirdparty, or the like. For example, a policy may restrict IM activity toonly support personnel for communicating with customers. This may allowcommunication for departments requiring access, but may maintain thenetwork bandwidth for other activities by restricting the use of IM toonly the personnel that need access to instant messaging (IM) in supportof the enterprise facility 102. In an embodiment, the policy managementfacility 112 may be a stand-alone application, may be part of thenetwork server facility 142, may be part of the enterprise facility 102network, may be part of the client facility, or the like.

The threat management facility 100 may provide configuration management,which may be similar to policy management, but may specifically examinethe configuration set of applications, operating systems, hardware, andthe like, and manage changes to their configurations. Assessment of aconfiguration may be made against a standard configuration policy,detection of configuration changes, remediation of improperconfiguration, application of new configurations, and the like. Anenterprise may keep a set of standard configuration rules and policieswhich may represent the desired state of the device. For example, aclient firewall may be running and installed, but in the disabled state,where remediation may be to enable the firewall. In another example, theenterprise may set a rule that disallows the use of USB disks, and sendsa configuration change to all clients, which turns off USB drive accessvia a registry.

The threat management facility 100 may also provide for the removal ofapplications that potentially interfere with the operation of the threatmanagement facility 100, such as competitor products that may also beattempting similar threat management functions. The removal of suchproducts may be initiated automatically whenever such products aredetected. In the case where such applications are services are providedindirectly through a third-party product, the application may besuspended until action is taken to remove or disable the third-partyproduct's protection facility.

Threat management against a quickly evolving malware environment mayrequire timely updates, and thus an update management facility 120 maybe provided by the threat management facility 100. In addition, a policymanagement facility 112 may also require update management (e.g., asprovided by the update facility 120 herein described). The updatemanagement for the security facility 122 and policy management facility112 may be provided directly by the threat management facility 100, suchas by a hosted system or in conjunction with the administration facility134. In embodiments, the threat management facility 100 may provide forpatch management, where a patch may be an update to an operating system,an application, a system tool, or the like, where one of the reasons forthe patch is to reduce vulnerability to threats.

The security facility 122 and policy management facility 112 may pushinformation to the enterprise facility 102 network and/or clientfacility. The enterprise facility 102 network and/or client facility mayalso or instead pull information from the security facility 122 andpolicy management facility 112 network server facilities 142, or theremay be a combination of pushing and pulling of information between thesecurity facility 122 and the policy management facility 112 networkservers 142, enterprise facility 102 network, and client facilities, orthe like. For example, the enterprise facility 102 network and/or clientfacility may pull information from the security facility 122 and policymanagement facility 112 network server facility 142 may request theinformation using the security facility 122 and policy managementfacility 112 update module; the request may be based on a certain timeperiod, by a certain time, by a date, on demand, or the like. In anotherexample, the security facility 122 and policy management facility 112network servers 142 may push the information to the enterprisefacility's 102 network and/or client facility by providing notificationthat there are updates available for download and then transmitting theinformation. The combination of the security management 122 networkserver facility 142 and security update module may functionsubstantially the same as the policy management facility 112 networkserver and policy update module by providing information to theenterprise facility 102 network and the client facility in a push orpull method. In an embodiment, the policy management facility 112 andthe security facility 122 management update modules may work in concertto provide information to the enterprise facility's 102 network and/orclient facility for control of application execution. In an embodiment,the policy update module and security update module may be combined intoa single update module.

As threats are identified and characterized, the threat managementfacility 100 may create definition updates that may be used to allow thethreat management facility 100 to detect and remediate the latestmalicious software, unwanted applications, configuration and policychanges, and the like. The threat definition facility 114 may containthreat identification updates, also referred to as definition files. Adefinition file may be a virus identity file that may includedefinitions of known or potential malicious code. The virus identity(IDE) definition files may provide information that may identifymalicious code within files, applications, or the like. The definitionfiles may be accessed by security management facility 122 when scanningfiles or applications within the client facility for the determinationof malicious code that may be within the file or application. Thedefinition files may contain a number of commands, definitions, orinstructions, to be parsed and acted upon, or the like. In embodiments,the client facility may be updated with new definition filesperiodically to provide the client facility with the most recentmalicious code definitions; the updating may be performed on a set timeperiod, may be updated on demand from the client facility, may beupdated on demand from the network, may be updated on a receivedmalicious code alert, or the like. In an embodiment, the client facilitymay request an update to the definition files from an update facility120 within the network, may request updated definition files from acomputing facility external to the network, updated definition files maybe provided to the client facility 114 from within the network,definition files may be provided to the client facility from an externalcomputing facility from an external network, or the like.

A definition management facility 114 may provide timely updates ofdefinition files information to the network, client facilities, and thelike. New and altered malicious code and malicious applications may becontinually created and distributed to networks worldwide. Thedefinition files that maintain the definitions of the malicious code andmalicious application information for the protection of the networks andclient facilities may need continual updating to provide continualdefense of the network and client facility from the malicious code andmalicious applications. The definition files management may provide forautomatic and manual methods of updating the definition files. Inembodiments, the network may receive definition files and distribute thedefinition files to the network client facilities, the client facilitiesmay receive the definition files directly, or the network and clientfacilities may both receive the definition files, or the like. In anembodiment, the definition files may be updated on a fixed periodicbasis, on demand by the network and/or the client facility, as a resultof an alert of a new malicious code or malicious application, or thelike. In an embodiment, the definition files may be released as asupplemental file to an existing definition files to provide for rapidupdating of the definition files.

In a similar manner, the security management facility 122 may be used toscan an outgoing file and verify that the outgoing file is permitted tobe transmitted per the enterprise facility 102 rules and policies. Bychecking outgoing files, the security management facility 122 may beable discover malicious code infected files that were not detected asincoming files as a result of the client facility having been updatedwith either new definition files or policy management facility 112information. The definition files may discover the malicious codeinfected file by having received updates of developing malicious codefrom the administration facility 134, updates from a definition filesprovider, or the like. The policy management facility 112 may discoverthe malicious code infected file by having received new updates from theadministration facility 134, from a rules provider, or the like.

The threat management facility 100 may provide controlled access to theenterprise facility 102 networks. For instance, a manager of theenterprise facility 102 may want to restrict access to certainapplications, networks, files, printers, servers, databases, or thelike. In addition, the manager of the enterprise facility 102 may wantto restrict user access based on certain criteria, such as the user'slocation, usage history, need to know, job position, connection type,time of day, method of authentication, client-system configuration, orthe like. Network access rules may be developed for the enterprisefacility 102, or pre-packaged by a supplier, and managed by the threatmanagement facility 100 in conjunction with the administration facility134.

A network access rules facility 124 may be responsible for determiningif a client facility application should be granted access to a requestednetwork location. The network location may be on the same network as thefacility or may be on another network. In an embodiment, the networkaccess rules facility 124 may verify access rights for client facilitiesfrom within the network or may verify access rights of computerfacilities from external networks. When network access for a clientfacility is denied, the network access rules facility 124 may send aninformation file to the client facility containing. For example, theinformation sent by the network access rules facility 124 may be a datafile. The data file may contain a number of commands, definitions,instructions, or the like to be parsed and acted upon through theremedial action facility 128, or the like. The information sent by thenetwork access facility rules facility 124 may be a command or commandfile that the remedial action facility 128 may access and take actionupon.

The network access rules facility 124 may include databases such as ablock list, a black list, an allowed list, a white list, an unacceptablenetwork site database, an acceptable network site database, a networksite reputation database, or the like of network access locations thatmay or may not be accessed by the client facility. Additionally, thenetwork access rules facility 124 may incorporate rule evaluation; therule evaluation may parse network access requests and apply the parsedinformation to network access rules. The network access rule facility124 may have a generic set of rules that may be in support of anenterprise facility's 102 network access policies, such as denyingaccess to certain types of websites, controlling instant messengeraccesses, or the like. Rule evaluation may include regular expressionrule evaluation, or other rule evaluation method for interpreting thenetwork access request and comparing the interpretation to theestablished rules for network access. In an embodiment, the networkaccess rules facility 124 may receive a rules evaluation request fromthe network access control and may return the rules evaluation to thenetwork access control.

Similar to the threat definitions facility 114, the network access rulefacility 124 may provide updated rules and policies to the enterprisefacility 102. The network access rules facility 124 may be maintained bythe network administration facility 134, using network access rulesfacility 124 management. In an embodiment, the network administrationfacility 134 may be able to maintain a set of access rules manually byadding rules, changing rules, deleting rules, or the like. Additionally,the administration facility 134 may retrieve predefined rule sets from aremote provider of a set of rules to be applied to an entire enterprisefacility 102. The network administration facility 134 may be able tomodify the predefined rules as needed for a particular enterprisefacility 102 using the network access rules management facility 124.

When a threat or policy violation is detected by the threat managementfacility 100, the threat management facility 100 may perform or initiatea remedial action facility 128. Remedial action may take a plurality offorms, such as terminating or modifying an ongoing process orinteraction, sending a warning to a client or administration facility134 of an ongoing process or interaction, executing a program orapplication to remediate against a threat or violation, recordinteractions for subsequent evaluation, or the like. Remedial action maybe associated with an application that responds to information that aclient facility network access request has been denied. In anembodiment, when the data file is received, remedial action may parsethe data file, interpret the various aspects of the data file, and acton the parsed data file information to determine actions to be taken onan application requesting access to a denied network location. In anembodiment, when the data file is received, remedial action may accessthe threat definitions to parse the data file and determine an action tobe taken on an application requesting access to a denied networklocation. In an embodiment, the information received from the facilitymay be a command or a command file. The remedial action facility maycarry out any commands that are received or parsed from a data file fromthe facility without performing any interpretation of the commands. Inan embodiment, the remedial action facility may interact with thereceived information and may perform various actions on a clientrequesting access to a denied network location. The action may be one ormore of continuing to block all requests to a denied network location, amalicious code scan on the application, a malicious code scan on theclient facility, quarantine of the application, terminating theapplication, isolation of the application, isolation of the clientfacility to a location within the network that restricts network access,blocking a network access port from a client facility, reporting theapplication to an administration facility 134, or the like.

Remedial action may be provided as a result of a detection of a threator violation. The detection techniques facility 130 may includemonitoring the enterprise facility 102 network or endpoint devices, suchas by monitoring streaming data through the gateway, across the network,through routers and hubs, and the like. The detection techniquesfacility 130 may include monitoring activity and stored files oncomputing facilities, such as on server facilities 142, desktopcomputers, laptop computers, other mobile computing devices, and thelike. Detection techniques, such as scanning a computer's stored files,may provide the capability of checking files for stored threats, eitherin the active or passive state. Detection techniques, such as streamingfile management, may provide the capability of checking files receivedat the network, gateway facility, client facility, and the like. Thismay provide the capability of not allowing a streaming file or portionsof the streaming file containing malicious code from entering the clientfacility, gateway facility, or network. In an embodiment, the streamingfile may be broken into blocks of information, and a plurality of virusidentities may be used to check each of the blocks of information formalicious code. In an embodiment, any blocks that are not determined tobe clear of malicious code may not be delivered to the client facility,gateway facility, or network.

Verifying that the threat management facility 100 is detecting threatsand violations to established policy, may require the ability to testthe system, either at the system level or for a particular computingcomponent. The testing facility 118 may allow the administrationfacility 134 to coordinate the testing of the security configurations ofclient facility computing facilities on a network. The administrationfacility 134 may be able to send test files to a set of client facilitycomputing facilities to test the ability of the client facility todetermine acceptability of the test file. After the test file has beentransmitted, a recording facility may record the actions taken by theclient facility in reaction to the test file. The recording facility mayaggregate the testing information from the client facility and reportthe testing information to the administration facility 134. Theadministration facility 134 may be able to determine the level ofpreparedness of the client facility computing facilities by the reportedinformation. Remedial action may be taken for any of the client facilitycomputing facilities as determined by the administration facility 134;remedial action may be taken by the administration facility 134 or bythe user of the client facility.

The threat research facility 132 may provide a continuously ongoingeffort to maintain the threat protection capabilities of the threatmanagement facility 100 in light of continuous generation of new orevolved forms of malware. Threat research may include researchers andanalysts working on known and emerging malware, such as viruses,rootkits a spyware, as well as other computer threats such as phishing,spam, scams, and the like. In embodiments, through threat research, thethreat management facility 100 may be able to provide swift, globalresponses to the latest threats.

The threat management facility 100 may provide threat protection to theenterprise facility 102, where the enterprise facility 102 may include aplurality of networked components, such as client facility, serverfacility 142, administration facility 134, firewall 138, gateway, hubsand routers 148, threat management appliance 140, desktop users, mobileusers, and the like. In embodiments, it may be the endpoint computersecurity facility 152, located on a computer's desktop, which mayprovide threat protection to a user, and associated enterprise facility102. In embodiments, the term endpoint may refer to a computer systemthat may source data, receive data, evaluate data, buffer data, or thelike (such as a user's desktop computer as an endpoint computer), afirewall as a data evaluation endpoint computer system, a laptop as amobile endpoint computer, a personal digital assistant or tablet as ahand-held endpoint computer, a mobile phone as an endpoint computer, orthe like. In embodiments, endpoint may refer to a source or destinationfor data, including such components where the destination ischaracterized by an evaluation point for data, and where the data may besent to a subsequent destination after evaluation. The endpoint computersecurity facility 152 may be an application loaded onto the computerplatform or computer support component, where the application mayaccommodate the plurality of computer platforms and/or functionalrequirements of the component. For instance, a client facility computermay be one of a plurality of computer platforms, such as Windows,Macintosh, Linux, and the like, where the endpoint computer securityfacility 152 may be adapted to the specific platform, while maintaininga uniform product and product services across platforms. Additionally,components may have different functions to serve within the enterprisefacility's 102 networked computer-based infrastructure. For instance,computer support components provided as hubs and routers 148, serverfacility 142, firewalls 138, and the like, may require unique securityapplication software to protect their portion of the systeminfrastructure, while providing an element in an integrated threatmanagement system that extends out beyond the threat management facility100 to incorporate all computer resources under its protection.

The enterprise facility 102 may include a plurality of client facilitycomputing platforms on which the endpoint computer security facility 152is adapted. A client facility computing platform may be a computersystem that is able to access a service on another computer, such as aserver facility 142, via a network. This client facility server facility142 model may apply to a plurality of networked applications, such as aclient facility connecting to an enterprise facility 102 applicationserver facility 142, a web browser client facility connecting to a webserver facility 142, an e-mail client facility retrieving e-mail from anInternet 154 service provider's mail storage servers 142, and the like.In embodiments, traditional large client facility applications may beswitched to websites, which may increase the browser's role as a clientfacility. Clients 144 may be classified as a function of the extent towhich they perform their own processing. For instance, client facilitiesare sometimes classified as a fat client facility or thin clientfacility. The fat client facility, also known as a thick client facilityor rich client facility, may be a client facility that performs the bulkof data processing operations itself, and does not necessarily rely onthe server facility 142. The fat client facility may be most common inthe form of a personal computer, where the personal computer may operateindependent of any server facility 142. Programming environments for fatclients 144 may include CURT, Delphi, Droplets, Java, win32, X11, andthe like. Thin clients 144 may offer minimal processing capabilities,for instance, the thin client facility may primarily provide a graphicaluser interface provided by an application server facility 142, which mayperform the bulk of any required data processing. Programmingenvironments for thin clients 144 may include JavaScript/AJAX, ASP, JSP,Ruby on Rails, Python's Django, PHP, and the like. The client facilitymay also be a mix of the two, such as processing data locally, butrelying on a server facility 142 for data storage. As a result, thishybrid client facility may provide benefits from both the fat clientfacility type, such as multimedia support and high performance, and thethin client facility type, such as high manageability and flexibility.In embodiments, the threat management facility 100, and associatedendpoint computer security facility 152, may provide seamless threatprotection to the plurality of clients 144, and client facility types,across the enterprise facility 102.

The enterprise facility 102 may include a plurality of server facilities142, such as application servers, communications servers, file servers,database servers, proxy servers, mail servers, fax servers, gameservers, web servers, and the like. A server facility 142, which mayalso be referred to as a server facility 142 application, serverfacility 142 operating system, server facility 142 computer, or thelike, may be an application program or operating system that acceptsclient facility connections in order to service requests from clients144. The server facility 142 application may run on the same computer asthe client facility using it, or the server facility 142 and the clientfacility may be running on different computers and communicating acrossthe network. Server facility 142 applications may be divided amongserver facility 142 computers, with the dividing depending upon theworkload. For instance, under light load conditions all server facility142 applications may run on a single computer and under heavy loadconditions a single server facility 142 application may run on multiplecomputers. In embodiments, the threat management facility 100 mayprovide threat protection to server facilities 142 within the enterprisefacility 102 as load conditions and application changes are made.

A server facility 142 may also be an appliance facility 140, where theappliance facility 140 provides specific services onto the network.Though the appliance facility 140 is a server facility 142 computer,that may be loaded with a server facility 142 operating system andserver facility 142 application, the enterprise facility 102 user maynot need to configure it, as the configuration may have been performedby a third party. In an embodiment, an enterprise facility 102 appliancemay be a server facility 142 appliance that has been configured andadapted for use with the threat management facility 100, and locatedwithin the facilities of the enterprise facility 102. The enterprisefacility's 102 threat management appliance may enable the enterprisefacility 102 to administer an on-site local managed threat protectionconfiguration, where the administration facility 134 may access thethreat resources through an interface, such as a web portal. In analternate embodiment, the enterprise facility 102 may be managedremotely from a third party, vendor, or the like, without an appliancefacility 140 located within the enterprise facility 102. In thisinstance, the appliance functionality may be a shared hardware productbetween pluralities of enterprises 102. In embodiments, the appliancefacility 140 may be located at the enterprise facility 102, where theenterprise facility 102 maintains a degree of control. In embodiments, ahosted service may be provided, where the appliance 140 may still be anon-site black box to the enterprise facility 102, physically placedthere because of infrastructure requirements, but managed by a thirdparty, vendor, or the like.

Simple server facility 142 appliances may also be utilized across theenterprise facility's 102 network infrastructure, such as switches,routers, wireless routers, hubs and routers, gateways, print servers,net modems, and the like. These simple server facility appliances maynot require configuration by the enterprise facility 102, but mayrequire protection from threats via an endpoint computer securityfacility 152. These appliances may provide interconnection serviceswithin the enterprise facility 102 network, and therefore may advancethe spread of a threat if not properly protected.

A client facility may be protected from threats from within theenterprise facility 102 network using a personal firewall, which may bea hardware firewall, software firewall, or combination of these, thatcontrols network traffic to and from a client. The personal firewall maypermit or deny communications based on a security policy. Personalfirewalls may be designed for use by end-users, which may result inprotection for only the computer on which it's installed. Personalfirewalls may be able to control network traffic by providing promptseach time a connection is attempted and adapting security policyaccordingly. Personal firewalls may also provide some level of intrusiondetection, which may allow the software to terminate or blockconnectivity where it suspects an intrusion is being attempted. Otherfeatures that may be provided by a personal firewall may include alertsabout outgoing connection attempts, control of program access tonetworks, hiding the client from port scans by not responding tounsolicited network traffic, monitoring of applications that may belistening for incoming connections, monitoring and regulation ofincoming and outgoing network traffic, prevention of unwanted networktraffic from installed applications, reporting applications that makeconnection attempts, reporting destination servers with whichapplications may be attempting communications, and the like. Inembodiments, the personal firewall may be provided by the threatmanagement facility 100.

Another important component that may be protected by an endpointcomputer security facility 152 is a network firewall facility 138, whichmay be a hardware or software device that may be configured to permit,deny, or proxy data through a computer network that has different levelsof trust in its source of data. For instance, an internal enterprisefacility 102 network may have a high level of trust, because the sourceof all data has been sourced from within the enterprise facility 102. Anexample of a low level of trust is the Internet 154, because the sourceof data may be unknown. A zone with an intermediate trust level,situated between the Internet 154 and a trusted internal network, may bereferred to as a “perimeter network.” Since firewall facilities 138represent boundaries between threat levels, the endpoint computersecurity facility 152 associated with the firewall facility 138 mayprovide resources that may control the flow of threats at thisenterprise facility 102 network entry point. Firewall facilities 138,and associated endpoint computer security facility 152, may also beassociated with a network node that may be equipped for interfacingbetween networks that use different protocols. In embodiments, theendpoint computer security facility 152 may provide threat protection ina plurality of network infrastructure locations, such as at theenterprise facility 102 network entry point, i.e. the firewall facility138 or gateway; at the server facility 142; at distribution pointswithin the network, i.e. the hubs and routers 148; at the desktop ofclient facility computers; and the like. In embodiments, the mosteffective location for threat detection may be at the user's computerdesktop endpoint computer security facility 152.

The interface between the threat management facility 100 and theenterprise facility 102, and through the appliance facility 140 toembedded endpoint computer security facilities, may include a set oftools that may be the same for all enterprise implementations, but alloweach enterprise to implement different controls. In embodiments, thesecontrols may include both automatic actions and managed actions.Automatic actions may include downloads of the endpoint computersecurity facility 152 to components of the enterprise facility 102,downloads of updates to existing endpoint computer security facilitiesof the enterprise facility 102, uploaded network interaction requestsfrom enterprise facility 102 components to the threat managementfacility 100, and the like. In embodiments, automatic interactionsbetween the enterprise facility 102 and the threat management facility100 may be configured by the threat management facility 100 and anadministration facility 134 in the enterprise facility 102. Theadministration facility 134 may configure policy rules that determineinteractions, such as developing rules for accessing applications, as inwho is authorized and when applications may be used; establishing rulesfor ethical behavior and activities; rules governing the use ofentertainment software such as games, or personal use software such asIM and VoIP; rules for determining access to enterprise facility 102computing resources, including authentication, levels of access, riskassessment, and usage history tracking; rules for when an action is notallowed, such as whether an action is completely deigned or justmodified in its execution; and the like. The administration facility 134may also establish license management, which in turn may furtherdetermine interactions associated with a licensed application. Inembodiments, interactions between the threat management facility 100 andthe enterprise facility 102 may provide threat protection to theenterprise facility 102 by managing the flow of network data into andout of the enterprise facility 102 through automatic actions that may beconfigured by the threat management facility 100 or the administrationfacility 134.

Client facilities within the enterprise facility 102 may be connected tothe enterprise facility 102 network by way of wired network facilities148A or wireless network facilities 148B. Client facilities connected tothe enterprise facility 102 network via a wired facility 148A orwireless facility 148B may receive similar protection, as bothconnection types are ultimately connected to the same enterprisefacility 102 network, with the same endpoint computer security facility152, and the same threat protected enterprise facility 102 environment.Mobile wireless facility clients 144B-F, because of their ability toconnect to any wireless 148B,D network access point, may connect to theInternet 154 outside the enterprise facility 102, and therefore outsidethe threat-protected environment of the enterprise facility 102. In thisinstance the mobile client facility (e.g., the clients 144B-F), if notfor the presence of the endpoint computer security facility 152 mayexperience a malware attack or perform actions counter to enterprisefacility 102 established policies. In addition, there may be a pluralityof ways for the threat management facility 100 to protect theout-of-enterprise facility 102 mobile client facility (e.g., the clients144 D-F) that has an embedded endpoint computer security facility 152,such as by providing URI filtering in personal routers, using a webappliance as a DNS proxy, or the like. Mobile client facilities that arecomponents of the enterprise facility 102 but temporarily outsideconnectivity with the enterprise facility 102 network may be providedwith the same threat protection and policy control as client facilitiesinside the enterprise facility 102. In addition, mobile the clientfacilities may receive the same interactions to and from the threatmanagement facility 100 as client facilities inside the enterprisefacility 102, where the mobile client facilities may be considered avirtual extension of the enterprise facility 102, receiving all the sameservices via their embedded endpoint computer security facility 152.

Interactions between the threat management facility 100 and thecomponents of the enterprise facility 102, including mobile clientfacility extensions of the enterprise facility 102, may ultimately beconnected through the Internet 154. Threat management facility 100downloads and upgrades to the enterprise facility 102 may be passed fromthe firewalled networks of the threat management facility 100 through tothe endpoint computer security facility 152 equipped components of theenterprise facility 102. In turn the endpoint computer security facility152 components of the enterprise facility 102 may upload policy andaccess requests back across the Internet 154 and through to the threatmanagement facility 100. The Internet 154 however, is also the paththrough which threats may be transmitted from their source. Thesenetwork threats 104 may include threats from a plurality of sources,including without limitation, websites, e-mail, IM, VoIP, applicationsoftware, and the like. These threats may attempt to attack a mobileenterprise client facility (e.g., the clients 144B-F) equipped with anendpoint computer security facility 152, but in embodiments, as long asthe mobile client facility is embedded with an endpoint computersecurity facility 152, as described above, threats may have no bettersuccess than if the mobile client facility were inside the enterprisefacility 102.

However, if the mobile client facility were to attempt to connect intoan unprotected connection point, such as at a secondary location 108that is not a part of the enterprise facility 102, the mobile clientfacility may be required to request network interactions through thethreat management facility 100, where contacting the threat managementfacility 100 may be performed prior to any other network action. Inembodiments, the client facility's 144 endpoint computer securityfacility 152 may manage actions in unprotected network environments suchas when the client facility (e.g., client 144F) is in a secondarylocation 108 or connecting wirelessly to a non-enterprise facility 102wireless Internet connection, where the endpoint computer securityfacility 152 may dictate what actions are allowed, blocked, modified, orthe like. For instance, if the client facility's 144 endpoint computersecurity facility 152 is unable to establish a secured connection to thethreat management facility 100, the endpoint computer security facility152 may inform the user of such, and recommend that the connection notbe made. In the instance when the user chooses to connect despite therecommendation, the endpoint computer security facility 152 may performspecific actions during or after the unprotected connection is made,including running scans during the connection period, running scansafter the connection is terminated, storing interactions for subsequentthreat and policy evaluation, contacting the threat management facility100 upon first instance of a secured connection for further actions andor scanning, restricting access to network and local resources, or thelike. In embodiments, the endpoint computer security facility 152 mayperform specific actions to remediate possible threat incursions orpolicy violations during or after the unprotected connection.

The secondary location 108 may have no endpoint computer securityfacilities 152 as a part of its computer components, such as itsfirewalls 138B, servers 142B, clients 144G, hubs and routers 148C-D, andthe like. As a result, the computer components of the secondary location108 may be open to threat attacks, and become potential sources ofthreats, as well as any mobile enterprise facility clients 144B-F thatmay be connected to the secondary location's 108 network. In thisinstance, these computer components may now unknowingly spread a threatto other components connected to the network.

Some threats may not come directly from the Internet 154, such as fromnon-enterprise facility controlled mobile devices that are physicallybrought into the enterprise facility 102 and connected to the enterprisefacility 102 client facilities. The connection may be made from directconnection with the enterprise facility's 102 client facility, such asthrough a USB port, or in physical proximity with the enterprisefacility's 102 client facility such that a wireless facility connectioncan be established, such as through a Bluetooth connection. Thesephysical proximity threats 110 may be another mobile computing device, aportable memory storage device, a mobile communications device, or thelike, such as CDs and DVDs, memory sticks, flash drives, external harddrives, cell phones, PDAs, MP3 players, digital cameras, point-to-pointdevices, digital picture frames, digital pens, navigation devices,tablets, appliances, and the like. A physical proximity threat 110 mayhave been previously infiltrated by network threats while connected toan unprotected network connection outside the enterprise facility 102,and when connected to the enterprise facility 102 client facility, posea threat. Because of their mobile nature, physical proximity threats 110may infiltrate computing resources in any location, such as beingphysically brought into the enterprise facility 102 site, connected toan enterprise facility 102 client facility while that client facility ismobile, plugged into an unprotected client facility at a secondarylocation 108, and the like. A mobile device, once connected to anunprotected computer resource, may become a physical proximity threat110. In embodiments, the endpoint computer security facility 152 mayprovide enterprise facility 102 computing resources with threatprotection against physical proximity threats 110, for instance, throughscanning the device prior to allowing data transfers, through securityvalidation certificates, through establishing a safe zone within theenterprise facility 102 computing resource to transfer data into forevaluation, and the like.

Having provided an overall context for threat detection, the descriptionnow turns to a brief discussion of an example of a computer system thatmay be used for any of the entities and facilities described above.

FIG. 2 illustrates a computer system. In general, the computer system200 may include a computing device 210 connected to a network 202, e.g.,through an external device 204. The computing device 210 may be orinclude any type of network endpoint or endpoints as described herein,e.g., with reference to FIG. 1 above. For example, the computing device210 may include a desktop computer workstation. The computing device 210may also or instead be any suitable device that has processes andcommunicates over a network 202, including without limitation a laptopcomputer, a desktop computer, a personal digital assistant, a tablet, amobile phone, a television, a set top box, a wearable computer (e.g.,watch, jewelry, or clothing), a home device (e.g., a thermostat or ahome appliance controller), just as some examples. The computing device210 may also or instead include a server, or it may be disposed on aserver.

The computing device 210 may be used for any of the entities describedin the threat management environment described above with reference toFIG. 1. For example, the computing device 210 may be a server, a clientan enterprise facility, a threat management facility, or any of theother facilities or computing devices described therein. In certainaspects, the computing device 210 may be implemented using hardware(e.g., in a desktop computer), software (e.g., in a virtual machine orthe like), or a combination of software and hardware (e.g., withprograms executing on the desktop computer), and the computing device210 may be a standalone device, a device integrated into another entityor device, a platform distributed across multiple entities, or avirtualized device executing in a virtualization environment.

The network 202 may include any network described above, e.g., datanetwork(s) or internetwork(s) suitable for communicating data andcontrol information among participants in the computer system 200. Thismay include public networks such as the Internet, private networks, andtelecommunications networks such as the Public Switched TelephoneNetwork or cellular networks using third generation cellular technology(e.g., 3G or IMT-2000), fourth generation cellular technology (e.g., 4G,LTE. MT-Advanced, E-UTRA, etc.) or WiMax-Advanced (IEEE 802.16m)) and/orother technologies, as well as any of a variety of corporate area,metropolitan area, campus or other local area networks or enterprisenetworks, along with any switches, routers, hubs, gateways, and the likethat might be used to carry data among participants in the computersystem 200. The network 202 may also include a combination of datanetworks, and need not be limited to a strictly public or privatenetwork.

The external device 204 may be any computer or other remote resourcethat connects to the computing device 210 through the network 202. Thismay include threat management resources such as any of thosecontemplated above, gateways or other network devices, remote servers orthe like containing content requested by the computing device 210, anetwork storage device or resource, a device hosting malicious content,or any other resource or device that might connect to the computingdevice 210 through the network 202.

The computing device 210 may include a processor 212, a memory 214, anetwork interface 216, a data store 218, and one or more input/outputdevices 220. The computing device 210 may further include or be incommunication with peripherals 222 and other external input/outputdevices 224.

The processor 212 may be any as described herein, and in general becapable of processing instructions for execution within the computingdevice 210 or computer system 200. The processor 212 may include asingle-threaded processor or a multi-threaded processor. The processor212 may be capable of processing instructions stored in the memory 214or on the data store 218.

The memory 214 may store information within the computing device 210 orcomputer system 200. The memory 214 may include any volatile ornon-volatile memory or other computer-readable medium, including withoutlimitation a Random Access Memory (RAM), a flash memory, a Read OnlyMemory (ROM), a Programmable Read-only Memory (PROM), an Erasable PROM(EPROM), registers, and so forth. The memory 214 may store programinstructions, program data, executables, and other software and datauseful for controlling operation of the computing device 200 andconfiguring the computing device 200 to perform functions for a user.The memory 214 may include a number of different stages and types fordifferent aspects of operation of the computing device 210. For example,a processor may include on-board memory and/or cache for faster accessto certain data or instructions, and a separate, main memory or the likemay be included to expand memory capacity as desired.

The memory 214 may, in general, include a non-volatile computer readablemedium containing computer code that, when executed by the computingdevice 200 creates an execution environment for a computer program inquestion, e.g., code that constitutes processor firmware, a protocolstack, a database management system, an operating system, or acombination of the foregoing, and/or code that performs some or all ofthe steps set forth in the various flow charts and other algorithmicdescriptions set forth herein. While a single memory 214 is depicted, itwill be understood that any number of memories may be usefullyincorporated into the computing device 210. For example, a first memorymay provide non-volatile storage such as a disk drive for permanent orlong-term storage of files and code even when the computing device 210is powered down. A second memory such as a random access memory mayprovide volatile (but higher speed) memory for storing instructions anddata for executing processes. A third memory may be used to improveperformance by providing even higher speed memory physically adjacent tothe processor 212 for registers, caching and so forth.

The network interface 216 may include any hardware and/or software forconnecting the computing device 210 in a communicating relationship withother resources through the network 202. This may include remoteresources accessible through the Internet, as well as local resourcesavailable using short range communications protocols using, e.g.,physical connections (e.g., Ethernet), radio frequency communications(e.g., WiFi), optical communications, (e.g., fiber optics, infrared, orthe like), ultrasonic communications, or any combination of these orother media that might be used to carry data between the computingdevice 210 and other devices. The network interface 216 may, forexample, include a router, a modem, a network card, an infraredtransceiver, a radio frequency (RF) transceiver, a near fieldcommunications interface, a radio-frequency identification (RFID) tagreader, or any other data reading or writing resource or the like.

More generally, the network interface 216 may include any combination ofhardware and software suitable for coupling the components of thecomputing device 210 to other computing or communications resources. Byway of example and not limitation, this may include electronics for awired or wireless Ethernet connection operating according to the IEEE802.11 standard (or any variation thereof), or any other short or longrange wireless networking components or the like. This may includehardware for short range data communications such as Bluetooth or aninfrared transceiver, which may be used to couple to other localdevices, or to connect to a local area network or the like that is inturn coupled to a data network 202 such as the Internet. This may alsoor instead include hardware/software for a WiMax connection or acellular network connection (using, e.g., CDMA, GSM, LTE, or any othersuitable protocol or combination of protocols). The network interface216 may be included as part of the input/output devices 220 orvice-versa.

The data store 218 may be any internal memory store providing acomputer-readable medium such as a disk drive, an optical drive, amagnetic drive, a flash drive, or other device capable of providing massstorage for the computing device 210. The data store 218 may storecomputer readable instructions, data structures, program modules, andother data for the computing device 210 or computer system 200 in anon-volatile form for subsequent retrieval and use. For example, thedata store 218 may store without limitation one or more of the operatingsystem, application programs, program data, databases, files, and otherprogram modules or other software objects and the like.

The input/output interface 220 may support input from and output toother devices that might couple to the computing device 210. This may,for example, include serial ports (e.g., RS-232 ports), universal serialbus (USB) ports, optical ports, Ethernet ports, telephone ports, audiojacks, component audio/video inputs, HDMI ports, and so forth, any ofwhich might be used to form wired connections to other local devices.This may also or instead include an infrared interface, RF interface,magnetic card reader, or other input/output system for coupling in acommunicating relationship with other local devices. It will beunderstood that, while the network interface 216 for networkcommunications is described separately from the input/output interface220 for local device communications, these two interfaces may be thesame, or may share functionality, such as where a USB port is used toattach to a WiFi accessory, or where an Ethernet connection is used tocouple to a local network attached storage.

A peripheral 222 may include any device used to provide information toor receive information from the computing device 200. This may includehuman input/output (I/O) devices such as a keyboard, a mouse, a mousepad, a track ball, a joystick, a microphone, a foot pedal, a camera, atouch screen, a scanner, or other device that might be employed by theuser 230 to provide input to the computing device 210. This may also orinstead include a display, a speaker, a printer, a projector, a headsetor any other audiovisual device for presenting information to a user.The peripheral 222 may also or instead include a digital signalprocessing device, an actuator, or other device to support control orcommunication to other devices or components. Other I/O devices suitablefor use as a peripheral 222 include haptic devices, three-dimensionalrendering systems, augmented-reality displays, magnetic card readers,and so forth. In one aspect, the peripheral 222 may serve as the networkinterface 216, such as with a USB device configured to providecommunications via short range (e.g., BlueTooth, WiFi, Infrared, RF, orthe like) or long range (e.g., cellular data or WiMax) communicationsprotocols. In another aspect, the peripheral 222 may provide a device toaugment operation of the computing device 210, such as a globalpositioning system (GPS) device, a security dongle, or the like. Inanother aspect, the peripheral may be a storage device such as a flashcard, USB drive, or other solid state device, or an optical drive, amagnetic drive, a disk drive, or other device or combination of devicessuitable for bulk storage. More generally, any device or combination ofdevices suitable for use with the computing device 200 may be used as aperipheral 222 as contemplated herein.

Other hardware 226 may be incorporated into the computing device 200such as a co-processor, a digital signal processing system, a mathco-processor, a graphics engine, a video driver, and so forth. The otherhardware 226 may also or instead include expanded input/output ports,extra memory, additional drives (e.g., a DVD drive or other accessory),and so forth.

A bus 232 or combination of busses may serve as an electromechanicalplatform for interconnecting components of the computing device 200 suchas the processor 212, memory 214, network interface 216, other hardware226, data store 218, and input/output interface. As shown in the figure,each of the components of the computing device 210 may be interconnectedusing a system bus 232 or other communication mechanism forcommunicating information.

Methods and systems described herein can be realized using the processor212 of the computer system 200 to execute one or more sequences ofinstructions contained in the memory 214 to perform predetermined tasks.In embodiments, the computing device 200 may be deployed as a number ofparallel processors synchronized to execute code together for improvedperformance, or the computing device 200 may be realized in avirtualized environment where software on a hypervisor or othervirtualization management facility emulates components of the computingdevice 200 as appropriate to reproduce some or all of the functions of ahardware instantiation of the computing device 200.

FIG. 3 illustrates a threat management system according to someimplementations. In general, the system 300 may include an endpoint 302,a firewall 304, a server 306 and a threat management facility 308coupled to one another directly or indirectly through a data network305, all as generally described above. Each of the entities depicted inFIG. 3 may, for example, be implemented on one or more computing devicessuch as the computing device described above with reference to FIG. 2. Anumber of systems may be distributed across these various components tosupport threat detection, such as a coloring system 310, a keymanagement system 312 and a heartbeat system 314 (or otherwise anendpoint health system), each of which may include software componentsexecuting on any of the foregoing system components, and each of whichmay communicate with the threat management facility 308 and an endpointthreat detection agent 320 executing on the endpoint 302 to supportimproved threat detection and remediation.

The coloring system 310 may be used to label or ‘color’ software objectsfor improved tracking and detection of potentially harmful activity. Thecoloring system 310 may, for example, label files, executables,processes, network communications, data sources and so forth with anysuitable label. A variety of techniques may be used to select staticand/or dynamic labels for any of these various software objects, and tomanage the mechanics of applying and propagating coloring information asappropriate. For example, a process may inherit a color from anapplication that launches the process. Similarly a file may inherit acolor from a process when it is created or opened by a process, and/or aprocess may inherit a color from a file that the process has opened.More generally, any type of labeling, as well as rules for propagating,inheriting, changing, or otherwise manipulating such labels, may be usedby the coloring system 310 as contemplated herein. A suitable coloringsystem is described in greater detail below with reference to FIG. 4.

The key management system 312 may support management of keys for theendpoint 302 in order to selectively permit or prevent access to contenton the endpoint 302 on a file-specific basis, a process-specific basis,an application-specific basis, a user-specific basis, or any othersuitable basis in order to prevent data leakage, and in order to supportmore fine-grained and immediate control over access to content on theendpoint 302 when a security compromise is detected. Thus for example,if a particular process executing on the endpoint is compromised, orpotentially compromised or otherwise under suspicion, access by thatprocess may be blocked (e.g., with access to keys revoked) in order toprevent, e.g., data leakage or other malicious activity. A suitable keymanagement system useful in this context is described in greater detailbelow with reference to FIG. 5.

The heartbeat system 314 may be used to provide periodic or aperiodicinformation from the endpoint 302 or other system components aboutsystem health, security, status, and so forth. The heartbeat system 314or otherwise an endpoint health system may thus in general include ahealth status report system for the endpoint 302, such as through theuse of a heartbeat system or the like. A heartbeat may be encrypted orplaintext, or some combination of these, and may be communicatedunidirectionally (e.g., from the endpoint 308 to the threat managementfacility 308) or bidirectionally (e.g., between the endpoint 302 and theserver 306, or any other pair of system components) on any usefulschedule. A suitable heartbeat system that can be used as part of theendpoint health system is described in greater detail below withreference to FIG. 6.

In general, these various monitoring and management systems maycooperate to provide improved threat detection and response. Forexample, the coloring system 310 may be used to evaluate when aparticular process is potentially opening inappropriate files, and apotential threat may be confirmed based on an interrupted heartbeat fromthe heartbeat system 314. The key management system 312 may then bedeployed to revoke access by the process to certain resources (e.g.,keys or file) so that no further files can be opened, deleted orotherwise modified. More generally, the cooperation of these systemsenables a wide variety of reactive measures that can improve detectionand remediation of potential threats to an endpoint.

FIG. 4 illustrates a system for behavioral tracking, coloring, andgeneration of indications of compromise (IOCs). In general, the system400 may include a number of entities participating in a threatmanagement process such as any of the entities and threat managementprocesses described herein. The threat management process may forexample employ techniques such as behavioral tracking, encryption,endpoint recording, reputation-based threat detection, behavioral-basedthreat detection, signature-based threat detection, and combinations ofthe foregoing, or any other suitable techniques for detecting threats toendpoints in an enterprise.

In general, the system 400 may include a number of endpoints 402, 412and a threat management facility 404 in an enterprise 410, such as anyof the enterprises described herein. An external analysis facility 406may analyze threat data and provide rules and the like for use by thethreat management facility 404 and endpoints 402, 412 in managingthreats to the enterprise 410. The threat management facility 404 mayreside locally (e.g., a part of, embedded within, or locally coupled tothe endpoint 402), a virtual appliance (e.g., which could be run by aprotected set of systems on their own network system(s)), a privatecloud, a public cloud, and so forth. The analysis facility 406 may storelocally-derived threat information. The analysis facility 406 may alsoor instead receive threat information from a third party source 416 suchas MITRE Corporation or any other public, private, educational or otherorganization that gathers information on network threats and providesanalysis and threat detection information for use by others. Each ofthese components may be configured with suitable programming toparticipate in the various threat detection and management techniquescontemplated herein. The threat management facility 404 may monitor anystream of data from an endpoint 402 exclusively, or use the full contextof intelligence from the stream of all protected endpoints 402, 412 orsome combination of these.

The endpoint 402 may be any of the endpoints described herein, or anyother device or network asset that might join or participate in theenterprise 410 or otherwise operate on an enterprise network. This may,for example, include a server, a client such as a desktop computer or amobile computing device (e.g., a laptop computer, a wearable device, atablet, and the like), a cellular phone, a smart phone, or othercomputing device suitable for participating in the enterprise 410.

In general, the endpoint 402 may include any number of computing objectssuch as an object 418 labeled with a descriptor 420. While the termobject has a number of specific meanings in the art, and in particularin object-oriented programming, it will be understood that the term‘object’ as used herein is intended to be significantly broader, and mayinclude any data, process, file or combination of these includingwithout limitation any process, application, executable, script, dynamiclinked library, file, data, database, data source, data structure,function, resource locator (e.g., uniform resource locator (URL) orother uniform resource identifier (URI)), or the like that might bemanipulated by one of the computing devices described herein.

An object 418 may also or instead include a remote resource, such as aresource identified in a URL. That is, while the objects 418 in FIG. 4are depicted as residing on the endpoint 402, an object 418 may alsoreside elsewhere in the system 400, while still being labeled with adescriptor 420 and tracked by the monitor 421 of the endpoint 402. Theobject 418 may be an item that is performing an action or causing anevent, or the object 418 may be an item that is receiving the action orresult of an event (i.e., the item in the system 400 being acted upon).

Where the object 418 is data or includes data, the object 418 may beencrypted or otherwise protected, or the object 418 may be unencryptedor otherwise unprotected. The object 418 may be a process or othercomputing object that performs an action, which may include a singleevent or a collection or sequence of events taken by a process. Theobject 418 may also or instead include an item such as a file or linesof code that are executable to perform such actions. The object 418 mayalso or instead include a computing component upon which an action istaken, e.g., a system setting (e.g., a registry key or the like), a datafile, a URL, or the like. The object 418 may exhibit a behavior such asan interaction with another object or component of the system 400.

In one aspect, objects 418 may be described in terms of persistence. Theobject 418 may, for example, be a part of a process, and remainpersistent as long as that process is alive. The object 418 may insteadbe persistent across an endpoint 402 and remain persistent as long as anendpoint 402 is active or alive. The object 418 may instead be a globalobject having persistence outside of an endpoint 418, such as a URL or adata store. In other words, the object 418 may be a persistent objectwith persistence outside of the endpoint.

Although many if not most objects 418 will typically be benign objectsforming a part of a normal, operating endpoint, an object 418 maycontain software associated with an advanced persistent threat (APT) orother malware that resides partially or entirely on the endpoint 402.The associated software may have reached the endpoint 402 in a varietyof ways, and may have been placed manually or automatically on theendpoint 402 by a malicious source. It will be understood that theassociated software may take any number of forms and have any number ofcomponents. For example, the associated software may include anexecutable file that can execute independently, or the associatedsoftware may be a macro, plug-in, or the like that executes withinanother application. Similarly, the associated software may manifest asone or more processes or threads executing on the endpoint 402. Further,the associated software may install from a file on the endpoint 402 (ora file remote from the endpoint 402), and the associated software maycreate one or more files such as data files or the like while executing.Associated software should be understood to generally include all suchfiles and processes except where a specific file or process is morespecifically noted.

A threat such as an APT may also take the form of an attack where noaltered or additional software is directly added or modified on theendpoint 402. Instead, an adversary may reuse existing software on thesystem 400 to perform the attacks. It is for this reason that simplyscanning for associated software may be insufficient for the detectionof APTs and it may be preferable to detect APTs based on the behavior ofthe software and associated objects 418 that are used by, for, and withthat software.

An object coloring system 414 may apply descriptors 420 to objects 418on the endpoint 402. This may be performed continuously by a backgroundprocess on the endpoint 402, or it may occur whenever an object 418 isinvolved in an action, such as when a process makes a call to anapplication programming interface (API) or takes some other action, orwhen a URL is used to initiate a network request, or when a read or awrite is performed on data in a file. This may also or instead include acombination of these approaches as well as other approaches, such as bypre-labeling a file or application when it is moved to the endpoint 402,or when the endpoint 402 is started up or instantiated. In general, theobject coloring system 414 may add, remove or change a color at anylocation and at any moment that can be practicably instrumented on acomputer system.

As noted above, the term ‘object’ as used herein is intended to includea wide range of computing objects and as such, the manner in whichparticular objects 418 are labeled or ‘colored’ with descriptors 420 mayvary significantly. Any object 418 that is performing an action may becolored at the time of and/or with a label corresponding to the action,or likewise any object 418 that is the target of the action may becolored at the time that it is used and/or with a label corresponding toa process or the like using the object 418. Furthermore, the operatingsystem runtime representation of the object 418 may be colored, or thepersistent object outside of the operating system may be colored (as isthe case for a File Handle or File Object within the operating system orthe actual file as stored in a file system), such as within anencryption header or other header applied to the file, or as part of adirectory attribute or any other persistent location within the file orfile system. A former coloring may be ephemerally tracked while theoperating system maintains the representation and the latter may persistlong after any reboots of the same operating system and likewise havemeaning when read or used by other endpoints 402. For processes, eachfile handle may be supplemented with a pointer or other mechanism forlocating a descriptor 420 for a particular object 420 that is a process.More specifically, each object 418 may be colored in any manner suitablefor appending information to that object 418 so that the correspondingdescriptor 420 can be retrieved and, where appropriate, updated.

The coloring system 414 may apply any suitable rules for adding andchanging descriptors 420 for objects 418. For example, when a processwith a certain descriptor accesses data with a different descriptor, thedescriptor for the process may be updated to correspond to the data, orthe descriptor for the data may be updated to correspond to the process,or some combination of these. Any action by or upon an object 418 maytrigger a coloring rule so that descriptors 420 can be revised at anyrelevant time(s) during processing.

In one aspect, colors will not explicitly indicate a compromisedsecurity state or other good/bad types of distinctions (although theymay be adapted to this use). Instead, colors may record some knowninformation or understanding about an object 418, such as a source, apurpose, and so forth. In this context, colors will not be used to labelactual or potential security compromises, but to identifyinconsistencies among interacting objects 418, and to restrict orcontrol access and use accordingly. For example, where an endpoint usesfile-system-based encryption as described herein, a process that iscolored as exposed to external resources (e.g., the Internet) may beprohibited from accessing cleartext data for protected files. Colors canalso be used in other contexts such as intrusion prevention, routingrules, and detection of odd or questionable behavior.

In one aspect, colors may be implemented as flags associated withobjects 418 that provide a short hand cache of potentially relevantinformation. While this information could also be obtained for an object418 through a careful inspection of related activity logs or other datarecording activities, the use of a cache of flags for coloringinformation makes the coloring information directly available andimmediately actionable, as distinguished from post hoc forensicactivities that are otherwise supported by data logging.

In one aspect, colors as contemplated herein may fall into two differentcategories: static colors and dynamic colors. Static colors may beexplicitly applied based on, e.g., a controlling application. Forexample, a static color may specify a status of an application or data,or an associated type of application (e.g., productivity, mail client,messaging, browser, word processing, financial, spreadsheet, etc.). Inthis context, a process will generally inherit static colors from asource executable, and will permit inferences for appropriate behaviorand related processes. Dynamic colors may be assigned based on directobservation of executing processes, and may not be inherited ortransferred among processes (although the presence of a dynamic colormay be used to draw another coloring inference upon interaction withanother process). Thus, the inheritance of colors may depend in partupon the type of color that is applied, or upon explicit inheritancerules provided for a particular color.

A descriptor 420 may take a variety of forms, and may in general includeany information selected for relevance to threat detection. This may,for example, be a simple categorization of data or processes such astrusted or untrusted. For example, in one embodiment described herein,data and processes are labeled as either ‘IN’ (e.g., trusted) or ‘OUT’(e.g., untrusted). The specific content of the label is unimportant, andthis may be a binary flag, text string, encrypted data or otherhuman-readable and/or machine-readable identifier, provided that thedescriptor 420 can facilitate discrimination among labeled files—in thisexample, between trusted objects 418 and untrusted objects 418 so that,e.g., trusted data can be selectively decrypted or encrypted for usewith trusted processes. Similarly, data may be labeled as corporate dataor private data, with similar type-dependent processing provided. Forexample, private data may be encrypted with a key exclusively controlledby the data owner, while corporate data may be encrypted using aremotely managed key ring for an enterprise operated by the corporation.

In another aspect, the descriptor 420 may provide a multi-tiered orhierarchical description of the object 418 including any informationuseful for characterizing the object 418 in a threat management context.For example, in one useful configuration the descriptor 420 may includea type or category, static threat detection attributes, and an explicitidentification. The type or category for the object 418 may be anycategory or the like that characterizes a general nature or use of theobject 418 as inferred from behavior and other characteristics. Thismay, for example, include categories such as ‘game,’ ‘financial,’‘application,’ ‘electronic mail,’ ‘image,’ ‘video,’ ‘browser,’‘antivirus,’ and so forth. The category may be more granular, or mayinclude hierarchical categories such as ‘application:spreadsheet,’‘application:word processing,’ and so forth. Such colors may be directlyinferred from a single action, a sequence of actions, or a combinationof actions and other colors, including, e.g., colors of processes andfiles related to a particular action, or other objects 418 that providecontext for a particular action or group of actions. One or more colorsmay also or instead be explicitly provided by a user or a process, orotherwise automatically or manually attributed to computer objects ascontemplated herein.

The static threat detection attributes may be any readily ascertainablecharacteristics of the object 418 useful in threat detection. This may,for example, include an antivirus signature, a hash, a file size, fileprivileges, a process user, a path or directory, declarations ofpermissions, an access (e.g., a resource access, or an API access), andso forth. Static threat detection attributes may also include attributesthat are derived by or supplied from other sources. For example, staticthreat detection attributes may include a reputation for an object 418,which may be expressed in any suitable or useful level of granularitysuch as with discrete categories (trusted/untrusted/unknown) or with anumerical score or other quantitative indicator. The explicitidentification may, in general, be what an object 418 calls itself,e.g., a file name or process name.

Some actions may transfer colors from a subject of the action to thetarget of the action. For example, when a process creates sub-processes,the sub-processes may inherit the colors of its parent(s). By way ofanother example, when a process is initially loaded from an executable,it may inherit the color(s) stored in the file system for or with theexecutable.

In general, the descriptor 420 may be provided in any suitable format.The descriptor 420 may for example be formed as a vector of binary flagsor other attributes that form the ‘color’ or description of an object418. The descriptor 420 may also, where appropriate, include scalarquantities for certain properties. For example, it may be relevant howmany times a system file was accessed, how many file handles a processhas open, how many times a remote resource was requested or how long aremote resource is connected, and this information may be suitablyincluded in the descriptor 420 for use in coloring objects with thecoloring system 414 and applying rules for IOC detection by the IOCmonitor 421.

An indication of compromise (IOC) monitor 421 may be provided toinstrument the endpoint 402 so that any observable actions by orinvolving various objects 418 can be detected. As with the coloringsystem 414, it will be understood that the types of observable actionswill vary significantly, and the manner in which the endpoint 402 isinstrumented to detect such actions will depend on the particular typeof object 418. For example, for files or the like, an API for a filesystem may be used to detect reads, writes, and other access (e.g.,open, read, write, move, copy, delete, etc.), and may be configured toreport to or otherwise initiate monitoring of the action taken with thefile through the file system. As another example, kernel objects may beinstrumented at the corresponding object handle or in some other manner.As a further example, a kernel driver may be used for intercepting aprocess startup. While a wide variety of objects are contemplatedherein, one of ordinary skill in the art may create suitableinstrumentation for any computing object so that it may be monitored bythe IOC monitor 421.

It will be noted that suitable instrumentation may be used for a varietyof functions and circumstances. For example, instrumentation mayusefully track requests for network access or other actions back to aparticular application or process, or data payloads back to a particularfile or data location. One of ordinary skill in the art can readilyimplement suitable traces and/or logging for any such information thatmight be useful in a particular IOC monitoring operation.

In general, the IOC monitor 421 applies rules to determine when there isan IOC 422 suitable for reporting to a threat management facility 404.It will be understood that an endpoint 402 may, in suitablecircumstances and with appropriate information, take immediate localaction to remediate a threat. However, the monitor 421 mayadvantageously accumulate a sequence of actions, and still moreadvantageously may identify inconsistencies or unexpected behaviorwithin a group of actions with improved sensitivity by comparingdescriptors 420 for various objects 418 involved in relevant actions andevents. In this manner, rules may be applied based upon the descriptors420 that better discriminate malicious activity while reducing thequantity and frequency of information that must be communicated to aremote threat management facility 404. At the same time, all of therelevant information provided by the descriptors 420 can be sent in anIOC 422 when communicating a potential issue to the threat managementfacility 404. For example, during the course of execution, a specificprocess (as evidenced by its observed actions) may be assigned colordescriptors indicating that it is a browser process. Further, thespecific process may be assigned an attribute indicating that it hasexposed itself to external URLs or other external data. Subsequently,the same process may be observed to be taking an action suitable for aninternal or system process, such as opening up shared memory to anotherprocess that has coloring descriptions indicating that it is a systemprocess. When this last action is observed, an inconsistency in thevarious color descriptors between the subject of the action—theexternally exposed browser process—and the target of the action mayresult in a well-defined IOC, which may be directly processed withimmediate local action taken. The IOC may also or instead be reportedexternally as appropriate.

Thus, an endpoint 402 in an enterprise 410 may be instrumented with acoloring system 414 and monitor 421 to better detect potentiallymalicious activity using descriptors 420 that have been selected forrelevance to threat detection along with a corresponding set of rulesdeveloped for the particular descriptors 420 that are being used tolabel or color various objects 418. By way of example, the object 418may be a web browser that starts off being colored as a ‘browser’ and an‘internet facing’ application. Based on this descriptor 420, a range ofbehaviors or actions may be considered normal, such as accessing remotenetwork resources. However, if an object 418 colored with thisdescriptor 420 attempted to elevate privileges for a process, or toaccess a registry or system files, then this inconsistency in action maytrigger a rule violation and result in an IOC 422.

In general, any action or series of actions that cumulatively invoke aparticular reporting or action rule may be combined into an IOC 422 andcommunicated to the threat management facility 404. For example, an IOC422 may include a malicious or strange behavior, or an indication of amalicious or strange behavior. The IOC 422 may be a normalized IOC thatexpresses one or more actions in a platform independent manner. That is,the IOC 422 may express a malicious behavior or suspected maliciousbehavior without reference to platform-specific information such asdetails of an operating system (e.g., iOS, MacOS, Windows, Android,Linux, and so forth), hardware, applications, naming conventions, and soforth. Thus, a normalized IOC may be suitable for identifying aparticular threat across multiple platforms, and may include platformindependent processes, actions, or behaviors, or may express suchprocess, actions, or behaviors in a platform independent manner. Thenormalized IOC may be generated from the IOC 422, e.g., it may be aconverted version of the IOC 422 suitable for use with multipleplatforms, or it may simply be any IOC 422 that has been created in aplatform independent form. Process colorization (i.e., using thecoloring system 414) as described herein may be used to create anormalized IOC.

In general, a threat management facility 404 for the enterprise 410 mayinclude an IOC collector 426 that receives the IOC 422 from the endpoint402 and determines an appropriate action. This may include any suitableremedial action, or where one or more IOCs 422 are inconclusive,continued monitoring or increased monitoring as appropriate.

The threat management facility 404 may provide a variety of threatmanagement or monitoring tools 424, any of which may be deployed inresponse to IOCs 422 collected by the IOC collector 426. These tools 424may include without limitation a scanning engine,whitelisting/blacklisting, reputation analysis, web filtering, anemulator, protection architecture, live protection, runtime detection,APT detection, network antivirus products, IOC detection, access logs, aheartbeat, a sandbox or quarantine system, and so forth.

The analysis facility 406 may provide a remote processing resource foranalyzing malicious activities and creating rules 434 suitable fordetecting IOCs 422 based on objects 420 and descriptors 420. It isgenerally contemplated that suitable attributes of certain descriptors418 and one or more rules 434 may be developed together so that objects418 can be appropriately labeled with descriptors 420 that permitinvocation of rules 434 and creation of IOCs 422 at appropriate times.The analysis facility 406 may include a variety of analysis tools 428including, without limitation, tools for regular expression,whitelisting/blacklisting, crowd sourcing, identifiers, and so forth.The analysis tools 428 may also or instead include information and toolssuch as URL look-ups, genotypes, identities, file look-up, reputations,and so forth. The analysis facility 406 may also provide numerousrelated functions such as an interface for receiving information on new,unknown files or processes, and for testing of such code or content in asandbox on the analysis facility 406.

The analysis facility 406 may also or instead include a compromisedetector 430, where the compromise detector 430 is configured to receivenew threat information for analysis and creation of new rules anddescriptors as appropriate, as well as corresponding remedial actions.The compromise detector 430 may include any tools described herein orotherwise known in the art for detecting compromises or evaluating newthreats in an enterprise 410.

In general, a rule 434 may be manually created with correspondinghuman-readable semantics, e.g., where a process is labeled as a browserprocess or other category or type that can be interpreted by a human. Itshould, however, be appreciated that the compromise detector 430 mayalso be configured to automatically generate descriptors 420 and rules434 suitable for distribution to a threat management facility 404 and anendpoint 402. In this latter mode, the meaning of a particulardescriptor 420 may not have a readily expressible human-readablemeaning. Thus, it will be understood that attributes selected forrelevance to threat detection may include conventional attributes, aswell as attributes without conventional labels or meaning except in thecontext of a particular, computer-generated rule for threat detection.

In general, the analysis facility 406 may be within an enterprise 410,or the analysis facility 406 may be external to the enterprise 410 andadministered, for example, by a trusted third party. Further, athird-party source 416 may provide additional threat data 438 oranalyses for use by the analysis facility 406 and the threat managementfacility 404. The third-party resource 416 may be a data resource thatprovides threat data 438 and analyses, where the threat data 438 is anydata that is useful in detecting, monitoring, or analyzing threats. Forexample, the threat data 438 may include a database of threats,signatures, and the like. By way of example, the third-party resource416 may be a resource provided by The MITRE Corporation.

The system 400 may include a reputation engine 440 storing a pluralityof reputations 442. The reputation engine 440 may include a reputationmanagement system for the generation, analysis, identification, editing,storing, etc., of reputations 442. The reputation engine 440 may includereputation-based filtering, which may be similar to the reputationfiltering discussed above with reference to FIG. 1. The reputationengine 440 may be located on the threat management facility 404 or theendpoint 402 as shown in FIG. 4, or the reputation engine 440 may belocated elsewhere in the system 400. The reputation engine 440 mayreceive an IOC 422 or a stream of IOCs 422, and may generate or utilizereputations 442 for the IOCs 422. The reputation engine 440 may also orinstead receive actions, behaviors, events, interactions, and so forth,and may generate or utilize reputations 442 for any of the foregoing.

The reputation engine 440 may generate or revise a reputation 442 basedon behaviors, actions, events, interactions, IOCs 422, other reputations442, a history of events, data, rules, state of encryption, colors, andso forth. The reputation engine 440 may utilize a third-party resource,e.g., for the third-party resource's reputation data.

The reputations 442 may include reputations for any of the objects 418as described herein. In general, the reputations 442 may relate to thetrustworthiness of the objects 418 or an attribute thereof (e.g., thesource of the object 418, a behavior of the object 418, another objectinteracting with the object 418, and so forth). The reputations 442 mayinclude lists of known sources of malware or known suspicious objects418. The reputations 442 may also or instead include lists of known safeor trusted resources or objects 418. The reputations 442 may be storedin a reputations database included on the reputation engine 440 orlocated elsewhere in the system 400. The reputations 442 may beexpressed in any suitable or useful level of granularity such as withdiscrete categories (e.g., trusted, untrusted, unknown, malicious, safe,etc.) or with a numerical score or other quantitative indicator. Thereputations 442 may also be scaled.

In general, in the system 400 of FIG. 4, a malicious activity on theendpoint 402 may be detected by the IOC monitor 421, and a correspondingIOC 422 may be transmitted to the threat management facility 404 forremedial action as appropriate. The threat management facility 404 mayfurther communicate one or more IOCs 422 to the analysis facility 406for additional analyses and/or resolution of inconclusive results. Otherdetails and variations are provided below. While the use of coloring andIOCs as contemplated herein can improve threat detection and remediationin a number of ways, the system 400 can be further improved withgranular control over access to endpoint data using an encryptionsystem. A system for key-based management of processes and files on anendpoint is now discussed in greater detail.

FIG. 5 illustrates a system for encryption management. Generally, thesystem 500 may include endpoints 502, an administration host 504, and athreat management facility 506, which may include policy manager 508 andkey manager 510. The system 500 may provide for the management of users512, policies 514, keys 516 (e.g., disposed on key rings 518), andendpoints 502 (e.g., from the administration host 504). The system 500may utilize various storage and processing resources, which may belocal, remote, virtual, disposed in a cloud, or the like.

The endpoints 502 may be any of the endpoints as described herein, e.g.,with reference to the other figures. The endpoints 502 may also orinstead include other end user devices and other devices to be managed.The endpoints 502 may include a web browser for use by the users 512,with supporting cryptographic functions implemented using cryptographiclibraries in the web browser. The endpoints 502 may communicate with theother components of the system 500 using any suitable communicationinterface, which may include Secure Socket Layer (SSL) encryption,Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS), and so forth for additionalsecurity.

The endpoints 502 may include objects as described herein. For example,the endpoints 502 may include processes 520 and files 522. The processes520 may be labeled (e.g., by a coloring system using descriptors asdescribed above) in such a manner that the process is ‘IN,’ where theprocess 520 is in compliance with policies 514 administered for theendpoint 502 from a remote threat management facility 506, or theprocess is ‘OUT,’ where the process 520 is out of compliance with apolicy (or a number of policies) in the policies 514 for an enterprise.This may provide IN processes 520A and OUT processes 520B as shown inFIG. 5. The files 522 may be similarly labeled by a coloring system withdescriptors that identify each file 522 as IN, where the file 522complies with the policies 514 and is accordingly encrypted using, e.g.,a remotely managed key ring 518, or the file is OUT, where the file 522does not conform to the policies 514 and is accordingly not encryptedusing the remotely managed key ring 518. This may provide IN files 522Aand OUT files 522B as shown in FIG. 5. One skilled in the art willrecognize that other objects of the endpoint 502 or other components ofthe system 500 may be labeled in a similar manner where they are eitherIN or OUT. By coloring objects in this manner and basing key access onthe corresponding color, the “IN” software objects may operate in aprotected environment that objectively appears to be in compliance withthe policies 514. Other files and processes may still be used on theendpoint 502, but they will operate in an “OUT” or unprotectedenvironment that cannot obtain access to any of the “IN” content orfunctionality.

In an implementation, the system 500 may include determining whether anendpoint 502 is IN or OUT or whether a component of the endpoint 502 isIN or OUT, which may be based upon a set of rules (e.g., the rulesoutlined herein) or policies such as the policies 514 described herein.In some aspects, if the entire endpoint 502 is OUT—that is, out ofcompliance with one or more policies 514, the endpoint 502 will not havekey access or access to any protected content. Conversely, if theendpoint 502 is IN, the endpoint 502 may have access to protectedcontent. Thus in one aspect, the notion of IN/OUT may be applied at anendpoint level, and data protection may be a consequence of endpointprotection. Endpoint protection may also or instead be applied at a moregranular level, e.g., by determining whether executables, processes 520,files 522, etc., on the endpoint 502 are IN or OUT, which may be basedupon rules or policies 514 as described herein.

The administration host 504 may include a web browser, which may includea cryptography library 524 and a web user interface (e.g., HTML,JavaScript, etc.). An administrator may utilize the web user interfaceto administer a key management system and perform administrativefunctions such as creating and distributing keys 516, establishingsecurity policies, creating key hierarchies and rules, and so forth. Theendpoint 502 may also include a cryptographic library 524 implementingcryptographic protocols for using key material in the key ring 518 toencrypt and decrypt data as needed.

The threat management facility 506 may include any of the threatmanagement facilities or similar systems described herein. In general,the threat management facility 506 may include a policy manager 508 andkey manager 510. Alternatively, one or more of the policy manager 508and key manager 510 may be located elsewhere on a network.

The policy manager 508 may implement one or more policies 514, andmaintain, distribute, and monitor the policies for devices in anenterprise. The policies 514 may include any policies 514 relating tosecure operation of endpoints 502 in an enterprise. This may, forexample, include hardware configuration policies, software configurationpolicies, communication policies, update policies, or any other policiesrelating to, e.g., the configuration of an endpoint 502, communicationsby an endpoint 502, software executing on an endpoint 502 and so forth.Policies 514 may include usage criteria based on, e.g., signatures,indications of compromise, reputation, user identity, and so forth. Withrespect to the key management system contemplated herein, the policies514 may include a cryptographic protocol design, key servers, userprocedures, and other relevant protocols, or these cryptographicprotocols may be provided elsewhere for use by the policy manager 508.The policies 514 may also include any rules for compliance includingthose mentioned above or any other suitable rules or algorithms that canbe applied to determine whether objects and components are ‘IN’ or ‘OUT’as contemplated herein.

The key manager 510 may be part of the threat management facility 506,or it may be remotely managed elsewhere, e.g., in a remote cloudresource or the like. The key manager 510 may also or instead bedisposed on the administration host 504 and one or more endpoints 502 ina manner independent of the threat management facility 506. In thismanner, all cryptographic operations may be isolated from the threatmanagement facility 506 and instead may be performed by a web browser orthe like executing on the administration host 504 or an endpoint 502.The key manager 510 may manage the keys 516, including managing thegeneration, exchange, storage, use, and replacement of keys 516. The keymanager 510 may include a key ring 518, where the keys 516 are disposedon the key ring 518 using one root key 526. The key manager 510 may alsoor instead include a variety of key management and other secureprocesses, including without limitation, administrator registration,establishing trust to endpoints 502, key distribution to endpoints 502,policy deployment, endpoint status reporting, and local key backup.

The users 512 may have full access to encrypted data. Alternatively, theusers 512 may have limited access to encrypted data, or no access toencrypted data. Access may be limited to users 512 using endpoints 502that are deemed ‘IN’ by the system, as well as to processes 520 that areIN, as further described herein.

The keys 516 may include cryptographic keys in a cryptosystem, i.e.,decryption keys. In one aspect, the keys 516 may be disposed on one keyring 518 using one root key 526. In general, the keys 516 may be createdand managed using, e.g., symmetric key technology, asymmetric keytechnology, or any other key technology or combination of keytechnologies suitable for securing data in an enterprise including, forexample the Data Encryption Standard (DES), Triple DES, AdvancedEncryption Standard (AES), elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), and soforth. The cryptosystem may also or instead include any suitable publickey infrastructure or the like supporting the distribution and use ofkeys for encryption, digital signatures, and so forth.

The key ring 518 may facilitate simplified management of the system 500.For example, by reducing the data protection system down to a single keyring 518, the system can eliminate or reduce the overhead for managementof keys 516. In one aspect, all of the data on a key ring 518 isprotected by one root key 526. By reducing the data protection systemdown to a single key ring 518 protected by one root key 526, allprivileged users 512 on uncompromised platforms can have access to allprotected data. In this embodiment, data is either ‘IN’ (i.e.,encrypted), or it's ‘OUT’ (i.e., not encrypted). In one aspect, thedefault system does not include any additional level of granularity ofaccess control.

The cryptography library 524 may be disposed on the administration host504 as shown in FIG. 5. The cryptography library 524 may also bedisposed on the endpoint 502, e.g., in a web browser, or it may bedisposed on another component of the system 500, or any combination ofthese. The cryptographic library 524 may be installed by anadministrator. In general, key material 530 from the key ring 518 may bestored in a cache 532 on the endpoint 502 within any suitable memory onthe endpoint 502 for use in encryption and decryption as contemplatedherein. As noted above, an enterprise that systematically uses coloringand indications of compromise can be improved through the use of asynchronized or integrated key management system as contemplated herein.This system may be still further improved with the addition of aheartbeat system that communicates heartbeats from an endpointcontaining health and status information about the endpoint. A suitableheartbeat system is now described in greater detail.

FIG. 6 illustrates a threat management system using heartbeats. Ingeneral, a system 600 may include an endpoint 602, a gateway 604, athreat management system 606, and an enterprise management system 608that manages an enterprise including the endpoint 602, the gateway 604,and one or more additional endpoints 610. Each of these components maybe configured with suitable programming to participate in the detectionand remediation of an advanced persistent threat (APT) or other malwarethreat as contemplated herein. Although the term “gateway” is used forthe device between an endpoint and an external network, it will beappreciated that this device may also or instead include a switch,router, firewall, and/or other network elements, any of which may beincluded in the “gateway” as that term is used herein.

The endpoint 602 may be any of the endpoints described herein, or anyother device or network asset that might join or participate in anenterprise network. The endpoint 602 may contain a threat 612 such as anadvanced persistent threat, virus, or similar malware that resides onthe endpoint 602. The threat 612 may have reached the endpoint 602 in avariety of ways, and may have been placed manually or automatically onthe endpoint 602 by a malicious source. It will be understood that thethreat 612 may take any number of forms and have any number ofcomponents. For example, the threat 612 may include an executable filethat can execute independently, or the threat 612 may be a macro,plug-in, or the like that executes within another application.Similarly, the threat 612 may manifest as one or more processes orthreads executing on the endpoint 602. The threat 612 may install from afile on the endpoint 602 or a file remote from the endpoint 602, and thethreat 612 may create one or more other files such as data files or thelike while executing. Advanced persistent threats can be particularlydifficult to detect and remediate, and the systems and methodscontemplated herein can advantageously provide improved sensitivity tosuch threats, as well as enabling improved remediation strategies.However, the systems and methods contemplated herein may also or insteadbe used to detect and remediate other types of malware threats. As such,in this context references to a particular type of threat (e.g., anadvanced persistent threat) should be understood to generally includeany type of malware or other threat to an endpoint or enterprise unlessa more specific threat or threat type is explicitly provided orotherwise clear from the context.

The threat 612 may be analyzed by one or more threat countermeasures onthe endpoint 602 such as a whitelisting filter 614 that approves eachitem of code before executing on the endpoint 602 and prevents executionof non-whitelisted code. The endpoint 602 may also include an antivirusengine 616 or other malware detection software that uses any of avariety of techniques to identify malicious code by reputation or othercharacteristics. A runtime detection engine 618 may also monitorexecuting code to identify possible threats. More generally, any of avariety of threat detection techniques may be applied to the threat 612before and during execution. In general, a threat 612 may evade theseand other security measures and begin executing as a process 620 on theendpoint 602.

Network traffic 622 from the process 620 may be monitored and logged bya traffic monitor 624 on the endpoint 602. The traffic monitor 624 may,for example, log a time and a source of each network request from theendpoint 602. Where the endpoint 602 is within an enterprise network,the network traffic 622 may pass through the gateway 604 in transit to adata network such as the Internet. While the gateway 604 may belogically or physically positioned between the endpoint 602 and anexternal data network, it will be understood that other configurationsare possible. For example, where the endpoint 602 is associated with anenterprise network but operating remotely, the endpoint 602 may form aVPN or other secure tunnel or the like to the gateway 604 for use of athreat management system 606, enterprise management system 608, and anyother enterprise resources.

The endpoint 602 may use a heartbeat 626 to periodically and securelycommunicate status to the gateway 604. The heartbeat 626 may be createdby a health monitor 628 within the endpoint 602, and may be transmittedto a remote health monitor 630, for example, at the gateway 604. Thehealth monitor 628 may monitor system health in a variety of ways, suchas by checking the status of individual software items executing on theendpoint 602, checking that antivirus and other security software is upto date (e.g., with current virus definition files and so forth) andrunning correctly, checking the integrity of cryptographic key stores,checking for compliance with enterprise security policies, and checkingany other hardware or software components of the endpoint 602 asnecessary or helpful for health monitoring. The health monitor 628 maythus condition the issuance of a heartbeat 626 on a satisfactory statusof the endpoint 602 according to any suitable criteria, enterprisepolices, and other evaluation techniques. The remote health monitor 630may also or instead be provided at the threat management facility 650,for example as part of the threat management system 606 or theenterprise management system 608.

The heartbeat 626 may be secured in any suitable manner so that thehealth monitor 630 can reliably confirm the source of the heartbeat 626and the status of the endpoint 602. To this end, the heartbeat 626 maybe cryptographically signed or secured using a private key so that themonitor 630 can authenticate the origin of the heartbeat 626 using acorresponding public key. In one aspect, the heartbeat 626 may include acombination of plaintext information and encrypted information, such aswhere the status information for the endpoint is provided in plaintextwhile a digital signature for authentication is cryptographicallysecured. In another aspect, all of the information in the heartbeat 626may be encrypted.

In one aspect, a key vault 632 may be provided on the endpoint tosupport cryptographic functions associated with a secure heartbeat. Anobfuscated key vault 632 may support numerous useful functions,including without limitation, private key decryption, asymmetricsigning, and validation with a chain of trust to a specific rootvalidation certificate. A variety of suitable key management andcryptographic systems are known in the art and may be usefully employedto a support the use of a secure heartbeat as contemplated herein. Thesystem may support a secure heartbeat in numerous ways. For example, thesystem may ensure that signing and decryption keys can only be used inauthorized ways and inside an intended Access Control mechanism. Thesystem may use “anti-lifting” techniques to ensure that a signing keycan only be used when the endpoint is healthy. The system may ensurethat attacking software cannot, without first reverse-engineering thekey vault 632, extract the original key material. The system may alsousefully ensure that an attacker cannot undetectably replace the publickeys in a root certificate store, either directly or indirectly, such asin an attack that tries to cause the code to validate against adifferent set of root keys without directly replacing any keys in theroot store.

A robust heartbeat 626 may usefully provide defensive mechanisms againstreverse engineering of obfuscated content (e.g., the private keymaterial stored in key vault 632, the code used to validate the correctrunning of the remainder of the systems as part of the heartbeat 626code itself) and any anti-lifting protections to prevent malware fromdirectly using the endpoint 602 (or the health monitor 628 on theendpoint 602) to continue to send out signed heartbeat packets (e.g.stating that “all is well” with the endpoint) after security mechanismshave been impaired, disabled, or otherwise compromised in any way.Lifting in this manner by malicious code can be materially mitigated byproviding statistical validation (e.g., with checksums of code) of callstacks, calling processes, and core processes. Likewise, statisticalchecks as well as checksum integrations into the cryptographiccalculations may protect against code changes in the heartbeat 626 codeitself.

A variety of useful techniques may be employed to improve security ofthe key vault 632 and the heartbeat 626. For example, the system may usedomain shifting so that original key material is inferred based onhardware and software properties readily available to the key vault 632,and to ensure that key material uses non-standard or varying algorithms.Software properties may, for example, include readily determined systemvalues such as hashes of nearby code. In another aspect, the keys may bedomain shifted in a manner unique to the endpoint 602 so that the mannerof statistical validation of call stacks and core software is unique tothe endpoint 602. Further the key vault may be provisioned so that apublic key stored in the key vault 632 is signed with a certificate (orinto a certificate chain) that can be externally validated by a networkappliance or other trusted third party or directly by the health monitor628 or remote health monitor 630.

The heartbeat 626 may encode any useful status information, and may betransmitted from the endpoint 602 on any desired schedule including anyperiodic, aperiodic, random, deterministic, or other schedule.Configured in this manner, the heartbeat 626 can provide secure,tamper-resistant instrumentation for status of the endpoint 602, and inparticular an indication that the endpoint 602 is online anduncompromised. A delay or disappearance of the heartbeat 626 from theendpoint 602 may indicate that the endpoint 602 has been compromised;however this may also simply indicate that the endpoint 602 has beenpowered off or intentionally disconnected from the network. Thus, othercriteria may be used in addition to the disappearance or interruption ofthe heartbeat 626 to more accurately detect malicious software. Somesuch techniques are described below, but it will be understood that thismay include any supplemental information that might tend to make anattack on the endpoint 602 more or less likely. For example, if theheartbeat 626 is interrupted but the endpoint 602 is still sourcingnetwork traffic, then an inference might suitably be made that theendpoint 602 is compromised.

The threat management system 606 may, in general, be any of the threatmanagement systems described herein. The enterprise management system608 generally provides tools and interfaces for administration of theenterprise and various endpoints 610 and other resources or assetsattached thereto. It will be understood that, the functions of thethreat management system 606 and the enterprise management system 608may vary, and general threat management and administration functions maybe distributed in a variety of ways between and among these and othercomponents. This is generally indicated in FIG. 6 as a threat managementfacility 650 that includes the threat management system 606 and theenterprise management system 608. It will be understood that either orboth of these system may be administered by third parties on behalf ofthe enterprise, or managed completely within the enterprise, or somecombination of these, all without departing from the scope of thisdisclosure. It will similarly be understood that a reference herein to athreat management facility 650 is not intended to imply any particularcombination of functions or components, and shall only be understood toinclude such functions or components as explicitly stated in aparticular context, or as necessary to provide countermeasures formalware (e.g., advanced persistent threats) as contemplated herein. Italso should be understood that the heartbeat may be monitored and/ormanaged by the threat management system 606, the enterprise managementsystem 608, or another component of the threat management facility 650.

The system 600 may include a certificate authority 660 or similar trustauthority or the like (shown as a “trusted third party” in the figure).In order to provide a meaningfully secure heartbeat 626, the heartbeat626 may be secured with reference to a trusted authority such as acertificate authority 660 that can issue cryptographic certificatesallowing other entities to rely on assertions about identity (e.g., byenabling verification with a trusted third party), and to enablecryptographically secure communications. The cryptographic techniquesfor creating and using such certificates and relationships are wellknown, and are not repeated here. The certificate authority 660 may beadministered by the enterprise management system 608 or some otherinternal resource of the enterprise, or the certificate authority 660may be administered by a trusted third party such as any of a variety ofcommercially available certificate authorities or the like. Thus, thecertificate authority 660, or some other similar cloud service or thelike, may operate as a security broker to register, e.g., endpoints 602,610, the gateway 604, the threat management facility 650, and so forth,and provide cryptographic material for each of the other trustingentities to securely communicate with one another.

Once registered with the certificate authority 660 in this fashion, theheartbeat may be used to establish trust between the endpoint 602 andother entities, and to validate the source of the heartbeat 626 when itis received. More generally, a heartbeat 626 secured in this manner mayprovide an encrypted channel between network entities such as anendpoint 602 and the gateway 604 (or a firewall or the like). The natureof the communication may provide a technique for validating the source,as well as obfuscating the contents with encryption. Thus when, forexample, the endpoint 602 provides information about a good/healthystate or a bad/compromised state, the recipient may rely on this stateinformation and act accordingly.

FIG. 7 shows an architecture for endpoint protection in an enterprisenetwork security system. In general, an endpoint may include aprocessing environment 702, a file system 706 (such as a data storagesystem or the like), a threat monitor 720 and a key wrapper 730.

The processing environment 702 may, for example, be any environment suchas an operating system or the like suitable for executing one or moreprocesses 704.

Each process 704 may be an instance of a software application, computerprogram, portion of a computer program or other code executing withinthe processing environment 702. A process 704 may execute, e.g., on aprocessor, group of processors, or other processing circuitry orplatform for executing computer-executable code. A process 704 mayinclude executable computer code, as well as an allocation of memory,file descriptors or handles for data sources and sinks, securityattributes such as an owner and any associated permissions, and acontext including the content of physical memory used by the process704. A process 704 may be or may include one or more threads. Moregenerally, a process 704 may include any code executing on an endpointsuch as any of the endpoints described herein.

The file system 706 may include a data storage system or the like, e.g.,where a data store including one or more files (e.g., the files 708shown in the figure) is included as part of the data storage system. Thefile system 706 may be generally associated with an operating systemthat provides the processing environment 702, and serves as anintermediary between processes 704 executing in the processingenvironment 702 and one or more files 708 accessible to the endpoint.The file system 706 may provide a directory structure or other constructto facilitate organization of the files 708, and the file system 706generally supports file functions such as creating, deleting, opening,closing, reading, writing, and so forth.

An extension 710 may be included in the file system 706 by modifying theoperating system kernel. While other programming techniques may beemployed to perform the functions of an extension 710 as contemplatedherein, direct modifications to or additions to the operating systempermit the extension 710 to operate transparently to the processingenvironment 702 and the processes 704 without requiring anymodifications or adaptations. The extension 710 may, for example, beimplemented as a file system filter (in a MICROSOFT WINDOWS environment)or a mount point to a directory (in an APPLE iOS environment). Theextension 710 to the files system as contemplated herein performs twoconcurrent functions. First, the extension 710 communicates with athreat monitor 720 in order to receive updates on the security statusand exposure status of the processes 704 or the endpoint. Second theextension 710 communicates with a key wrapper 730 that provides keymaterial for encrypting and decrypting data in the files 708. Finally,the extension 710 operates to conditionally provide encryption anddecryption of the files 708 for the processes 704 based on a currentsecurity or exposure state, as described in greater detail below.

The threat monitor 720 may include any suitable threat monitoring,malware detection, antivirus program or the like suitable for monitoringand reporting on a security state of an endpoint or individual processes704 executing thereon. This may include local threat monitoring using,e.g., behavioral analysis or static analysis. The threat monitor 720 mayalso or instead use reputation to evaluate the security state ofprocesses 704 based on the processes 704 themselves, source files orexecutable code for the processes 704, or network activity initiated bythe processes 704. For example, if a process 704 requests data from aremote URL that is known to have a bad reputation, this information maybe used to infer a compromised security state of the endpoint. While athreat monitor 720 may operate locally, the threat monitor 720 may alsoor instead use remote resources such as a gateway carrying traffic toand from the endpoint, or a remote threat management facility thatprovides reputation information, malware signatures, policy informationand the like for the endpoint and other devices within an enterprisesuch as the enterprise described above.

The threat monitor 720 may also or instead monitor the health of one ormore of the system, an endpoint, a process 704, and so forth. The healthmonitoring may be used to provide periodic or aperiodic information fromone or more system components about system health, security, status, andso forth. Implementations may include using the health monitoring forcontrolling access, e.g., to files 708, to keys 734, to key material forencrypting and decrypting individual files 708, and so forth.

In general, the threat monitor 720 provides monitoring of a securitystate and an exposure state of the endpoint. The security state may, forexample, be ‘compromised’, ‘secure’, or some other state or combinationof states. This may be based on detections of known malware, suspiciousactivity, policy violations and so forth. The exposure state may be‘exposed’ or ‘unexposed’, reflecting whether or not a particular process704 or file 708 has been exposed to potentially unsafe content. Thus,exposure may not necessarily represent a specific threat, but thepotential for exposure to unsafe content. This may be tracked in avariety of ways, such as by using the coloring system described abovewith reference to FIG. 5.

The key wrapper 730 may contain a key ring 732 with one or more keys 734for encrypting and decrypting files 708. The key ring 732 may becryptographically protected within the key wrapper 730 in order toprevent malicious access thereto, and the key wrapper 730 maycommunicate with the extension 710 to provide keys 734 for accessing thefiles 708 at appropriate times, depending, for example, on whetherprocesses 704 are secure or exposed. In one aspect, the files 708 arestored in a non-volatile memory such as a disk drive, or in a randomaccess memory that provides a cache for the disk drive, and the keywrapper 730 may be stored in a separate physical memory such as avolatile memory accessible to the operating system and the extension 710but not to processes 704 executing in the user space of the processingenvironment 702.

In one aspect, every document or file on the endpoint may have aseparate key. This may be, for example, a unique, symmetric key that canbe used for encryption and decryption of the corresponding file. The keywrapper 730 may control access to the key material for encrypting anddecrypting individual files, and may be used by the extension 710 tocontrol access by individual processes 704 executing on the endpoint. Asdescribed herein, the extension 710 may generally control access tofiles 708 based on an exposure state, a security state, or other contextsuch as the user of a calling process or the like. In the event of asevere compromise, or a detection of a compromise independent ofparticular processes, a key shredding procedure may be invoked todestroy the entire key wrapper 730 immediately and prevent any furtheraccess to the files 708. In such circumstances, the keys can only berecovered by the endpoint when a remediation is confirmed.Alternatively, the files may be accessed directly and decrypted from asecure, remote resource that can access the keys 734.

FIG. 8 shows a method for securing an endpoint. In general, all of thefiles within the file system may be encrypted to place them in aprotected state, and then a file system extension such as any of theextensions described above may be used to conditionally grant access byprocesses to the encrypted files.

As shown in step 802, the method 800 may begin with encrypting aplurality of files on an endpoint to prevent unauthorized access to theplurality of files. This may, for example, include encrypting filesusing an extension to a file system such as a file system interface,file system filter, mount point, or other suitable extension to aninterface between a user environment for executing processes and a filestored in memory on the endpoint. An interface may provide aprogrammatic or services-oriented interface to a file system. Forexample, the interface may provide a web-based REST interface to a datastore that presents as a file system. Encryption may be performed forall content on the endpoint when the endpoint is created or initialized,or when the file system extension is added an operating system for theendpoint, or at some other useful or convenient time. In one aspect,encryption may be performed as a background process over an extendedperiod of time so that the endpoint can remain in use during an initialencryption process. In another aspect, encryption may be performed whenfiles are accessed for the first time, or the initial encryption may bescheduled for a time when the endpoint is not typically in use, e.g.,early hours of the morning.

As shown in step 804, the method 800 may include receiving a request toaccess one of the files from a process executing on the endpoint. Ingeneral, this includes receiving an access request at a file system, orat a file system interface, filter, or mount point for the file system,or any other extension to file system. With files encrypted as describedabove, the file system may operate in an ordinary fashion andtransparently to the process (or a computing environment for theprocess) to provide file access functions such as opening, closing,creating, deleting, reading, writing, and so forth, while managingencryption and decryption through the file system extension. The fileaccess function may include an access request as generally contemplatedby step 804, which may initially include a request to open or create afile, and may subsequently include read or write operations or otherconventional file functions.

As shown in step 806, the method 800 may include decrypting the one ofthe files for the process. In general, this may be performedtransparently by the file system. That is, the process(es) accessingfiles that are managed by the file system do not need any cryptographicinformation or other programming overhead. Rather, they simply initiaterequests to the file system in a conventional manner, and the filesystem applies an extension such as any of those described above tomanage cryptographic access to files stored by the file system subjectto any of the conditions contemplated herein (e.g., an appropriatesecurity state or exposure state). The file system extension may in turnconditionally provide encryption and decryption functions based on acurrent security state of the process. In general, all of the filesmanaged by the file system may be encrypted, and decrypting a file mayinclude accessing a cryptographic key for the files using a file systeminterface, filter, mount point, or other file system extension andapplying the cryptographic key to decrypt the one of the files.

In one aspect, the file system extension (e.g., file system interface,filter or mount point) may be configured to respond to an indication ofa severe compromise (e.g., the entire endpoint, multiple processes, or aknown, severe threat) by deleting key material stored on the endpoint toprevent all access to files within the file system. Any suitable keyrecovery techniques may be used to recover the deleted key material oncea compromise has been fully resolved. Key recovery may include local keyrecovery techniques, remote key recovery techniques, or some combinationof these. This provides a technique for completely disabling orprotecting an endpoint against further data leakage or damage when asevere compromise is detected.

As shown in step 808, the method 800 may include using the file that hasbeen accessed, such as by reading data from the file, writing data tothe file, closing the file, saving the file, and so forth.

As shown in step 810, the method 800 may include monitoring a securitystate of the process that accessed the file. In general, monitoring maybe performed by code within the file system extension, or monitoring maybe performed by one or more local or remote processes for monitoringreputation, integrity, health, security and the like, any or all ofwhich may communicate with the file system extension to provide updateson a security state of the process or an endpoint executing the process.Monitoring may employ any of the techniques contemplated herein. By wayof non-limiting examples, this may include behavior analysis such asdetecting a compromised state of the process based on a behavior of theprocess, a behavior of an associated process, and a behavior of theendpoint. This may also or instead include static analysis such aslocally monitoring the process with a file scanner that performs staticanalysis on related files such as a file (or files) that the processlaunches from, or a file (or files) that get loaded into the processduring execution.

More generally, monitoring the security state of the process may includemonitoring observable behaviors for the process. This may include apattern of file behavior by the process such as reading, writing,creating, deleting, and combinations of the foregoing. This may also orinstead include persistence behavior such as the process writing to aregistry or other locations that contain code used at startup toinitialize an endpoint (e.g., writing to a registry). In another aspect,this may include inter-process communications such as communicationsbetween processes and other process-related actions such as creation ofa new process, thread injection, memory injection, and so forth. Inanother aspect, this may include direct detection of exploits based onspecific behaviors, or detection of files loaded into the process thatmay contain harmful features such as shared dynamic linked libraries,user data files, templates, macros, and so forth.

Monitoring the security state may also or instead include monitoringnetwork behavior such as network traffic associated with the process.For network traffic, coloring techniques such as those described abovemay be used to label network traffic to facilitate identification andtracking. For example, monitoring the security state of the process mayinclude adding an application identifier to the network trafficoriginating from the process, wherein the application identifierexplicitly identifies an application associated with the process andmonitoring network traffic from the process at a gateway between theendpoint and a data network based on the application identifier. Theendpoint may also log relevant information to facilitate suchmonitoring. For example, monitoring may include generating a log ofnetwork requests by logging network requests and applications making thenetwork requests. With network behavior locally logged in this manner,monitoring the security state may further include storing an applicationidentifier in the log of network requests, where the applicationidentifier explicitly identifies an application associated with a sourceprocess for a network request, and monitoring network requests from theapplication at a gateway between the endpoint and a data network basedon the application identifier.

As shown in step 812, the security state may be evaluated to determinewhether the security state has become a compromised state. Thisevaluation may occur periodically on some fixed or variable schedule, orin response to other events, or the evaluation may be performed by anexternal software component that pushes notifications to the file systemextension when exposures are detected. If the security state is ‘notcompromised’ (a ‘no’ to the compromised inquiry) then the endpoint pointmay continue to operate in the ordinary fashion and the method 800 mayreturn to step 808 where the open file is used. If the security state isa compromised state (a ‘yes’ to the compromised inquiry), then themethod 800 may proceed to step 814 where additional action can be taken.

As shown in step 814, while the executing process is in the compromisedstate, the method 800 may include maintaining access to any open ones ofthe plurality of files including the file requested in step 804. Ingeneral, access may be maintained by continuing to provideencryption/decryption for the open files through a file system extensionas described above, or using any other analogous technique. In thismanner, the process may continue to execute, preventing a catastrophicor inconvenient termination of an application or the like for the user.The user may continue to use a file, save the file, or otherwisecontinue with a process in any suitable manner. This may expose someencrypted files within the file system to potentially harmful processes.However, an inference can be made that by the time a compromise isdetected, the open files have already been potentially affected. At thispoint, the remediation strategy can shift to preventing a further spreadof harmful impact to other files and data on the endpoint whileminimizing impact to the current user.

As shown in step 816 the method 800 may include including prohibitingaccess to other ones of the plurality of files. In general, access maybe prohibited by withholding encryption/decryption functions for theother files through a file system extension as described above, or usingany other analogous technique. Prohibiting access may includeprohibiting access to all other files managed by the file system, orpermitting access to some files while prohibiting access to a subset offiles that are identified as protected, confidential, or otherwiselabeled for heightened protection. In this manner, when a compromise isdetected, the compromised process may continue to execute while beingisolated from other files that the process has not yet touched.

As shown in step 818, the method 800 may include providing anotification to a user in a display of the endpoint. The notificationmay indicate a required remediation step for the process to resolve thecompromised state, and the notification may inform the user that anapplication associated with the process cannot access additional filesuntil the user completes the required remediation step. For example, thenotification may include a pop-up window or the like with text stating:“Process X is compromised. You must close all files and restart thisprocess before accessing other content with Process X.” The notificationmay include a number of buttons or the like such as “okay”, “remediatenow,” “remediate later,” and so forth.

As shown in step 820, the method 800 may include initiating aremediation of the process. In one aspect, this may include facilitatinga restart of the process, such as in response to a user input receivedfrom the notification described above.

As shown in step 822, the method 800 may include remediating thecompromise. Where the compromise is dynamic in nature, e.g., based oncode loaded into an executing process, a restart of the process may besufficient to fully remediate the compromised state. However, additionalremediation steps may be required including registry repair, removal orreinstallation of an application, deletion of files or other clean upand remediation. A variety of tools are known in the art and may beusefully deployed to attempt remediation based upon the nature of thecompromised state.

As shown in step 824, the remediation may be evaluated for success. Ifthe remediation is successful, the method 800 may proceed to step 826where access is restored by the process to the plurality of filesmanaged by the file system. The process may then return to step 808where files are used in the ordinary manner and encryption anddecryption services are transparently provided to the process by thefile system extension. If the remediation is unsuccessful, then theprocess may return to step 814 where the process can continue to accessopen files but no other files. In this latter case of unsuccessfulremediation, additional steps may be taken, such as quarantining anendpoint, permanently disabling the process, or otherwise applyingheightened restrictions to the endpoint or the process.

An endpoint such as any of the endpoints described above may beconfigured according to the foregoing method 800 to provide endpointsecurity. Thus in one aspect, a system disclosed herein includes anendpoint with a first memory storing a plurality of files that aremanaged by a file system and encrypted to prevent unauthorized access,as well as a second memory that stores key material for decrypting theplurality of files. The first memory and the second memory may beseparate physical memories such as a non-volatile disk-based memorystoring the plurality of files and a volatile random access memorystoring the key material. The endpoint may include a processor and aprocess executing on the processor. A file system executing on theprocessor may be configured to manage access to the plurality of filesby the process, and may be further configured to respond to a requestfrom the process for one of the files by conditionally decrypting theone of the files based on a security state of the process. As describedabove, the file system may conditionally decrypt files using anextension to an operating system of the endpoint such as a file systeminterface, filter, mount point, or other extension.

The system may include a gateway such as any of the gateways describedabove. The gateway may be coupled in a communicating relationship withthe endpoint and configured to monitor the security state of the processbased on network traffic or other behavioral observations for theprocess. The system may also or instead include a threat managementfacility such as any of the threat management facilities described abovecoupled in a communicating relationship with the endpoint and configuredto remotely monitor the security state of the process based onindications of compromise received from the endpoint.

FIG. 9 shows a method for securing an endpoint. In general, the method900 may operate in a similar manner to the method described above, witha notable exception that the overall method 900 monitors exposure of aprocess to potentially unsafe content rather than detecting compromisedstates. It will be appreciated that the method 900 of FIG. 9 may be usedinstead of or in addition to the method 800 of FIG. 8. That is the twomethods may be applied sequentially or in parallel, or some combinationof these, by incorporating suitable code/logic into a file systemextension that controls access to a cryptographically secured filesystem.

As shown in step 902, the method 900 may begin with encrypting aplurality of files on an endpoint to prevent unauthorized access to theplurality of files. This may, for example, include encrypting filesusing an extension to a file system such as a file system interface,filter, mount point, or other suitable extension to an interface betweena user environment for executing processes and a files stored in memoryon the endpoint. Encryption may be performed for all content on theendpoint when the endpoint is created or initialized, or when the filesystem extension is added an operating system for the endpoint, or atsome other useful or convenient time. In one aspect, encryption may beperformed as a background process over an extended period of time sothat the endpoint can remain in use during an initial encryptionprocess. In another aspect, encryption may be performed when files areaccessed for the first time, or the initial encryption may be scheduledfor a time when the endpoint is not typically in use, e.g., early hoursof the morning.

As shown in step 904, the method 900 may include receiving a request toaccess one of the files from a process executing on the endpoint. Ingeneral, this includes receiving an access request at a file system, orat a file system interface, filter or mount point for the file system,or any other extension to file system described herein. With filesencrypted as described above, the file system may operate in an ordinaryfashion and transparently to the process (or a computing environment forthe process) to provide file access functions such as opening, closing,creating, deleting, reading, writing, and so forth, while managingencryption and decryption through the file system extension. The fileaccess function may include an access request as generally contemplatedby step 804, which may initially include a request to open or create afile, and may subsequently include read or write operations or otherconventional file functions.

As shown in step 906, the method 900 may include decrypting the one ofthe files for the process. In general, this may be performedtransparently by the file system. That is, the process(es) accessingfiles that are managed by the file system do not need any cryptographicinformation or other programming overhead. Rather, they simply initiaterequests to the file system in a conventional manner, and the filesystem applies an extension such as any of those described above tomanage cryptographic access to files stored by the file system subjectto any of the conditions contemplated herein (e.g., an appropriatesecurity state or exposure state). The file system extension may in turnconditionally provide encryption and decryption functions based on acurrent security state of the process. In general, all of the filesmanaged by the file system may be encrypted, and decrypting a file mayinclude accessing a cryptographic key for the files using a file systeminterface, filter, mount point, or other file system extension andapplying the cryptographic key to decrypt the one of the files.

In one aspect, the file system extension (e.g., file system interface,filter, or mount point) may be configured to respond to an indication ofa compromise, or an indication of a severe compromise (e.g., the entireendpoint, multiple processes, or a known, severe threat) by deleting acryptographic key or other key material stored on the endpoint toprevent all access to files within the file system. Any suitable keyrecovery techniques may be used to recover the deleted key material oncea compromise has been fully resolved. Key recovery may include local keyrecovery techniques, remote key recovery techniques, or some combinationof these. This provides a technique for completely disabling orprotecting an endpoint against further data leakage or damage when asevere compromise is detected.

As shown in step 908, the method 900 may include using the file that hasbeen accessed, such as by reading data from the file, writing data tothe file, closing the file, saving the file, and so forth.

As shown in step 910, the method 900 may include monitoring an exposurestate of the process on the endpoint to potentially unsafe content. Ingeneral, exposure will have a state of ‘exposed’ or ‘secure’ is based onactual or potential exposure of an executing process to potentiallyunsafe content such as risky network locations, files outside theencrypted file system, and so forth. A variety of rules may be used todetect exposure.

In general, monitoring the exposure state of the process to potentiallyunsafe content may include applying a plurality of behavioral rules todetermine whether the exposure state of the process is either exposed orsecure. Under a basic rule set, the process may be initially identifiedas secure, and then identified as exposed based on contact with contentother than the plurality of files securely managed by the file system.In another aspect, a process may be initially categorized as exposeduntil a source, user, or other aspects of the process are authenticated.In one aspect, exposure may be measured using a simplified rule setwherein (1) the process is initially identified as secure, (2) theprocess is identified as exposed when the process opens a networkconnection to a Uniform Resource Locator that is not internal to anenterprise network of the endpoint and that has a reputation that ispoor, (3) the process is identified as exposed when the process opens afirst file that is identified as exposed, and (4) the process isidentified as exposed when another exposed process opens a handle to theprocess. The reputation of the Uniform Resource Locator may be obtainedfrom a remote threat management facility such as any of the remotethreat management facilities described herein, or the reputation may belooked up in a local database or the like. Where exposure of the firstfile is used as a basis for determining when the process is exposed,exposure of the first file may be determined in a variety of ways. Forexample, the first file may be labeled or colored as exposed using thetechniques described above, based on some prior context or activity forthe file. Or the file may be identified as exposed based on a scan ofthe file for the presence of malware or the like.

Other conditions or rules may also or instead be used to measure when aprocess is exposed to potentially unsafe content. For example, themethod 900 may include identifying the first file as exposed when atleast one of the following conditions is met: (1) the first file is notone of the plurality of files; (2) the first file is saved by a secondprocess that is identified as exposed; and (3) a source of the firstfile has a low reputation.

As shown in step 912, the process may be evaluated for exposure topotentially unsafe content. This evaluation may occur periodically onsome fixed or variable schedule, or in response to other events, or theevaluation may be performed by an external software component thatpushes notifications to the file system extension when exposures aredetected. When the process is not exposed (i.e., the exposure state is‘secure’), the process may return to step 908 and continue to use fileswithin the file system. When the process is exposed, then the method 900proceeds to step 914.

As shown in step 914, when the process is exposed the method 900 mayinclude restricting access by the process to the files managed by thefile system, more specifically by controlling access to the filesthrough a file system interface, filter, mount point, or other extensionto the file system that conditionally decrypts one or more of theplurality of files for the process according to the exposure state ofthe process. In this context, restricting access by the process to thefiles may include maintaining access to any of the plurality of filesthat have been opened by the process before the process became exposed,and preventing access to other ones of the plurality of files, all asgenerally described above by way of example in the method 800 of FIG. 8.

As shown in step 918, the method 800 may include providing anotification to a user in a display of the endpoint. The notificationmay indicate a required remediation step for the process to resolve theexposed state, and the notification may inform the user that anapplication associated with the process cannot access additional filesuntil the user completes the required remediation step. For example, thenotification may include a pop-up window or the like with text stating:“Process X is exposed to potentially unsafe content. You must close allfiles and restart this process before accessing other content withProcess X.” The notification may include a number of buttons or the likesuch as “okay”, “remediate now,” “remediate later,” and so forth.

As shown in step 920, the method 800 may include initiating aremediation of the process. In one aspect, this may include facilitatinga restart of the process, such as in response to a user input receivedfrom the notification described above, or automatically in the absenceof user input.

As shown in step 922, the method 800 may include remediating theexposure. In one aspect, this may include restarting the process. Othersteps may include closing or deleting the files that caused theexposure, scanning the endpoint for related content or potentialthreats, and so forth. The process may also be scanned after a restartto determine whether the exposure has resulted in any instantiation ofmalware or the like. A variety of other tools are known in the art andmay be usefully deployed to attempt remediation based upon the nature ofthe exposed state.

As shown in step 924, the remediation may be evaluated for success. Ifthe remediation is successful, the method 800 may proceed to step 926where access is restored for the process to the plurality of filesmanaged by the file system. The process may then return to step 908where files are used in the ordinary manner and encryption anddecryption services are transparently provided to the process by thefile system extension. If the remediation is unsuccessful, then theprocess may return to step 914 where the process can continue to accessopen files but no other files. In this latter case of unsuccessfulremediation, additional steps may be taken, such as quarantining anendpoint, permanently disabling the process, or otherwise applyingheightened restrictions to the endpoint or the process.

It will be appreciated that the method for evaluating exposure asdescribed with respect to FIG. 9 may be used exclusively, or may be usedconcurrently or sequentially with the method for evaluating compromisedescribed with reference to FIG. 8. That is, a method may usefullymonitor a security state and an exposure state at the same time, and useeither or both of these states to improve endpoint security ascontemplated herein. In another aspect, both compromise and exposure maybe collectively tracked as two different values to a single securitystate, with rules applied by the file system extension for file accessand remediation according to value. Thus, while monitoring exposure, themethod 900 may also include monitoring a security state of the processand restricting access by the process to the plurality of files when thesecurity state is compromised. As described above, monitoring thesecurity state may include monitoring the security state at a threatmanagement facility or locally monitoring the security state with amalware file scanner.

In another aspect an endpoint such as any of the endpoints describedabove may implement the techniques for exposure monitoring and responseas described above. A corresponding system may include an endpoint witha processor and a first memory storing a plurality of files that areencrypted to prevent unauthorized access. A process may be executing onthe endpoint, and a file system on the endpoint may be configured tomanage access to the plurality of files by the process. The file systemmay include an extension such as a file system interface, filter, or amount point configured to monitor an exposure state of the process andto restrict access to the one of the files based on the exposure stateof the process by conditionally decrypting the one of the files based onthe exposure state. The file system may maintain access to any of thefiles that have been opened by the process before the process becameexposed, while preventing access to other ones of the files. Theendpoint may include an integrity monitor such as the threat monitordescribed above configured to evaluate the exposure state by applying aplurality of behavioral rules to determine whether the exposure state ofthe process is either exposed or secure, wherein the process isinitially identified as secure and the process is identified as exposedbased on contact with content other than the plurality of files. Theendpoint may include a remediation component configured to remediate theprocess using any of the techniques described herein and return theprocess from the exposed state to the secure state for unrestrictedaccess to the plurality of files. The remediation component may includeany software component, either local to the endpoint or remote from theendpoint, or some combination of these containing code adapted todelete, uninstall, quarantine, isolate, reconfigure, reprogram, monitoror otherwise remediate malicious or potentially malicious code on theendpoint.

The integrity monitor may be further configured to identify the processas exposed according to the plurality of behavioral rules, wherein one,two, or all three of the following may be determined: (1) the process isidentified as exposed when the process opens a network connection to aUniform Resource Locator that is not internal to an enterprise networkof the endpoint and that has a reputation that is poor, (2) the processis identified as exposed when the process opens a first file that isidentified as exposed, and (3) the process is identified as exposed whenanother exposed process opens a handle to the process.

FIG. 10 shows a system for creating portable encrypted content. Ingeneral, the system may include a host 1004 such as client or any of theother computing devices described above that can be operated by a userto perform various computing tasks. In a user interface 1005 presentedon a display by the host 1004, the user may select a file 1006 that theuser wishes to send to a recipient or otherwise share. The file 1006 maybe a file locally stored on the host 1004 or a file selected from aremote location such as a web folder, remote data storage facility, orother remote resource. The file may include any of the file typesdescribed herein, as well as multiple file types bundled into a zippedfolder or other container with a multi-file payload. In another aspect,the user may select multiple files at one time (and optionally frommultiple locations) for inclusion in a single portable encrypted object.A user may also supply a password in the user interface that can be usedas described below to locally unwrap the file from a container 1014 forportable encrypted content without access to a remote key server orother remote resources.

The host 1004 may provide credentials to an identity service 1010 inorder to receive a token that can be associated with one or morerecipients who can also authenticate to the identity service 1010. Foreach intended recipient, the identity service 1010 may supply anauthentication token uniquely identifying the recipient. The token may,for example, be signed or otherwise cryptographically protected in anymatter suitable for creating or maintaining desired trust relationshipsamong the sender, recipient, and a remote key server. The identityservice 1010 may, for example, include a dedicated identity service suchas the AWS Identity and Access Management platform available from AmazonWeb Services, Inc. Other platforms such as social networking platformsand the like may also or instead be used to provide unique tokens forusers based on authentication credentials. In another aspect, the tokenmay be supplied by a host operating system such as Windows, which canprovide an authentication token to a user authenticated to the WindowsActive Directory.

In one aspect, multiple identity services 1010 may be used. So, forexample, where the sender and the recipient are associated withdifferent organizations or entities, a (cryptographic) trustrelationship between these entities may be used to support trans-entitycommunications using portable objects as contemplated herein. Whilenumerous techniques may be used to implement this type of system, suchas by hosting both entities at the same identity service, or byproviding a way for members of one entity to use (or at least selectfrom an identity list of) another entity, they will generally share theproperty of either automatically identifying a permitted recipient froma different entity, or permitting the sender to select a recipient froma list of identities that include users not directly associated with thesenders host organization. All such variations that would be apparent toone of ordinary skill in the art may be used to supportcross-organizational secure communication of data and files ascontemplated herein.

In another aspect, outbound communications may be examined so that anyattachments addressed to other organizations or domains that have apre-established cryptographic trust relationship with the sender domaincan be automatically encrypted using the techniques described herein.This may, for example, include identifying the recipient domain,retrieving an identity token from an identity service for the recipientat the recipient domain, and then creating a portable encrypted objectas otherwise described herein. In one aspect, the password for localdecryption may be automatically selected by a gateway or otherintermediate network element that is monitoring outbound communications.In another aspect, the sender may be prompted to provide a password.

The host 1004 may then present this token to a remote keystore 1012along with any other suitable identifying information for the senderand/or recipient, along with any digital signatures, hashes or the like.The remote keystore 1012 may be any suitable remote key server that canbe operated to receive tokens, associate keys with the tokens, andreturn the keys to the host 1004.

With this information, the file 1006 may be wrapped and distributed asportable encrypted content. The container 1014 may include a number ofsoftware components. This may, for example, include user interface logic1016 operable to provide a user interface on a receiving machine asnecessary for a recipient to unwrap the file 1006 from the container1014. For example, the user interface logic 1016 may include tools forvarious types of key retrieval, e.g., by retrieving a token from theidentity service 1010 and transmitting this to the remote keystore 1012,or by directly presenting suitable credentials to the remote keystore1012 to recover the key, or by receiving a password in a local userinterface and using the password to recover the key 1024 that isencrypted and wrapped in the container 1014. Cryptographic tools 1018may also be included in the container 1014 so that no additionalcryptographic libraries are required on a recipient machine.

An authentication module 1020 may also be encoded into the container1014 to control various authentication processes contemplated herein. Ingeneral, the authentication module 1020 is operable to authenticate auser, such as the recipient of the container 1014, to the remotekeystore 1012. This may include retrieving an authentication token fromthe identity service 1010, obtaining the authentication token from alocal operating system (e.g., from Active Directory) or, if anauthentication token is already present on the recipient machine, usingthis token to retrieve the key from the remote keystore 1012. The userinterface logic 1016 may also support direct retrieval of the key fromthe remote keystore 1012 through direct entry of valid keystorecredentials such as a username and password.

The file 1006 may be encrypted using the key 1024 (or an encryption keyfrom an asymmetric key pair), and as noted above, the key 1024 itself(or the decryption key from an asymmetric key pair) may be encrypted andwrapped into the container 1014 for local recovery of a file by anyonewith the appropriate password 1008. Thus, the password may be receivedby the host 1004 from a user and used to encrypt the key 1024 that wasreceived from the remote keystore 1012. This encrypted instance of thekey 1024 may be safely included in the container 1014 in this encryptedform without compromising security of the container 1014, whileproviding a file recovery mechanism even if other access information(e.g. the authentication token or identity service 1010 credentials) hasbeen lost or changed.

FIG. 11 illustrates a process 1100 for unwrapping portable encryptedcontent. In this example, a file 1101 is encrypted within a container(the container is shown as the unwrapper 1102 in the figure) disposed ona host system 1116. In this example, federated authentication is appliedsuch that the container 1102 authenticates using an authenticationmodule 1108 to the identity service 1120. The identity service 1120transparently retrieves a token 1106 and presents the token 1106 to thekeystore 1122 to receive a key for decrypting the contained file 1101with the cryptographic module 1110, for example without any explicituser interaction beyond selecting the contained file 1101 for use. A keyaccess module 1104 may also or instead be used as shown.

FIG. 12 illustrates a process 1200 for unwrapping portable encryptedcontent. In this example, a host system 1216 has already authenticatedto an identity service 1220, so the token 1206 is already present on thehost system 1216. In this case, the authentication module (not shown)does not need to authenticate to the identity service 1220, and the keyaccess module 1204 can directly access the keystore 1222 with the token1206 to retrieve a key (e.g., for decrypting the contained file 1201with the cryptographic module 1210 included in the container, which isshown as the unwrapper 1202 in the figure), again for example withoutany explicit user interaction beyond selecting the contained file 1201for use.

FIG. 13 illustrates a process 1300 for unwrapping portable encryptedcontent. In this example, a user 1330 directly provides a password 1332for accessing a file 1301. The key access module 1309 can use thepassword 1332 to decrypt a copy of the decryption key wrapped in thecontainer on the host system 1316 (the container is shown as theunwrapper 1302 in the figure) without access to remote resources such asa remote keystore or a remote identity service. The system may furtherinclude a cryptographic module 1310 as shown in the figure.

FIG. 14 illustrates a process 1400 for unwrapping portable encryptedcontent. In this example, the container (the container is shown as theunwrapper 1402 in the figure) receives credentials such as a usernameand a password for directly accessing a remote keystore 1422, e.g., in auser interface presented to a recipient of the container on the hostsystem 1416. The authentication credentials can be used to obtain a keyfrom a remote keystore 1422. In general, the user interface may prompt auser for input. Other information, such as biometric information, tokeninformation, cryptographic information, text or graphic information, andthe like may be used as part of or incorporated with or withoutcryptographic operations into authentication data that is provided tothe keystore 1422 for authentication. More generally, the user interfacemay be presented when the contents of the container (e.g., a file 1401)cannot be accessed transparently, and may present one or more options tothe user for accessing the contents using various techniques such asthose described above. For example, the user interface may present anumber of buttons or other selection options for, e.g., password access,remote keystore credentials, identity service credentials, and so forth.The system may further include a key access module 1409, a cryptographicmodule 1410, and an authentication module 1408.

FIG. 15 shows a flowchart of a process 1500 for creating portableencrypted content.

As shown in step 1502, the method 1500 may begin with receiving aselection of a file for encryption from a user. This may include aselection from a local directory, a web directory, a remote file store,a file management system, and so forth. This may include a manual stepwithin a user interface of specifying a file for encryption as describedherein, or this may include automatic encryption for any file that isoutbound from an endpoint, e.g., via electronic mail, text message, ftpfile transfer, upload to a remote location, and so forth. In anotheraspect, the creation of a container with the encrypted file may occurautomatically under predetermined conditions, such as when a file isselected from specific directories or when a file is of a certain type,size, date, author, origin, and so forth. Thus the creation ofcontainers for content leaving an endpoint may be automatic, manual, orsome combination of these.

As shown in step 1504, the method 1500 may include requesting a tokenfor the file. This may, for example include an authentication token froma first computing environment to which the recipient can authenticateusing authentication credentials. The token may uniquely identifying arecipient of the file, or a group of authorized recipients, or someother group, entity, or combination of the foregoing. The token may bedigitally signed or otherwise cryptographically processed in a mannerthat permits verification of origin. In one aspect, the computingenvironment may include an endpoint, e.g., where an authentication tokenis obtained from Active Directory or some other operating system serviceor other local resource or the like. In another aspect, the computingenvironment may include a remote identity and access management systemsuch as the AWS Identity and Access Management system or a socialnetworking platform configured to support authentication tokens ascontemplated herein.

As shown in step 1506, the method 1500 may include receiving the tokenfrom the first computing environment. In general, the token may beuniquely associated with an authenticated entity such as an intendedrecipient of the container so that the intended recipient cansubsequently retrieve the token and use this to obtain a decryption keyfor the container or “wrapper.”

As shown in step 1508, the method 1500 may include transmitting thetoken to the remote key server. This may include transmitting otherinformation necessary or helpful for verifying the identity of the tokensender. The remote key server may associate the token with an intendedrecipient of the file so that, when the token is presented to the keyserver, the key server can in turn provide the corresponding decryptionkey.

As shown in step 1510, the method 1500 may include requesting acryptographic key associated with the token from the remote key server.The cryptographic key may include a symmetric key, or an asymmetric keypair containing an encryption key and a decryption key. As used herein,the terms encryption key and decryption key are intended to refer toeither the same key (e.g., where the keys are symmetric) or differentkeys (e.g., where the keys are asymmetric) unless a more specificmeaning is explicitly provided or otherwise clear from the context. Therequest may include any suitable configuration or parameterizationinformation that might be required by the remote key server, such asinformation to negotiate or select security protocols, informationspecifying strength of encryption, the destination path or file name forkey material, connection information or requirements, and so forth.

As shown in step 1512, the method 1500 may include receiving thecryptographic key from the remote key server. This may include receivingthe cryptographic key through a secure connection, or this may includeother steps to secure the key. As noted above, the cryptographic key maybe a symmetric key so that the encryption key and the decryption key arethe same key, or the cryptographic key may be an asymmetric key pairincluding an encryption key for encrypting data that is different from adecryption key for decrypting any data encrypted with the encryptionkey.

As shown in step 1514, the method 1500 may include receiving a passwordfrom the user for local decryption of a file or files in the container.Where a user manually selects files for wrapping, a user interface onthe host may present a window or dialogue box for the user to input apassword that can subsequently be used to decrypt the file from thecontainer. Where files are automatically wrapped as described above, adefault password may be used, or a password may be automatically createdon a per-file basis (or some other basis, e.g., per-day, per-recipient,etc.) and communicated to the sender through some alternative, securemedium, e.g. through an instant message, a separate electronic mail, avoice message, or the like.

As shown in step 1516, the method 1500 may include encrypting the filewith the encryption key to create an encrypted file.

As shown in step 1518, the method 1500 may include encrypting thedecryption key to create an object that can be decrypted using thepassword to recover the decryption key. Thus the decryption key fordecrypting the file from the container can be wrapped into the containerin order to provide a backup method for extracting the file in theabsence of authentication.

As shown in step 1520, the method 1500 may include combining theencrypted file, the object containing the decryption key, andapplication logic providing a user interface for accessing the file intoa portable encrypted data object such as any of the containers describedabove. Other application logic such as cryptographic libraries, useinterface features, and so forth may be usefully incorporated into thisobject to enhance functionality and ease of use. The user interface maygenerally provide a number of different modes for accessing the filesuch as those described above. For example, the user interface mayprovide a first mode of accessing the file by supplying the password tolocally decrypt the decryption key and a second mode of accessing thefile by retrieving the decryption key from the remote key server.

The user interface may incorporate programming logic for the variousother modes of file access and authentication. For example, the userinterface may transparently decrypt the file without user interventionin appropriate circumstances, such as when the recipient has alreadyauthenticated to the first computing environment with the authenticationcredentials. The user interface may also or instead include logic for anauthentication module that can remotely retrieve the token from thefirst computing environment using the authentication credentials andtransmit the token to the remote key server to retrieve the decryptionkey. The user interface may support a further mode of accessing the fileby receiving the authentication credentials in the user interface andapplying the authentication credentials to retrieve the token. When therecipient is already authenticated to the first computing environment,this may also include transparently decrypting the file for therecipient automatically without explicit user interaction.

The user interface may provide a further mode of accessing the file byproviding the decryption key itself through the user interface. That is,the user may obtain the decryption key by other means, and provide thisdirectly to the container through the user interface, or by providing apointer to a locally accessible instance of the key. The user interfacemay also or instead provide a mode of accessing the file by providinguser credentials to the remote key server. In this embodiment, suitablecredentials can be entered by a user through the user interface, and theapplication logic within the container can access the remote keystore toretrieve any needed key material for decrypting the file.

The portable encrypted data object may use a variety of programmingtechniques for encapsulating a user interface and cryptographyfunctionality in a relatively universal format. For example, the objectmay include a hypertext markup language file such as an HTML5 file(HTML5 is the current version of the Hypertext Markup Language (HTML)used for structuring and presenting content on the World Wide Web)containing encryption and decryption logic, user interface program code,and so forth. Where the portable encrypted data object is realized inthis form, additional functions and features may be added. For example,a recipient may open and edit the enclosed file—either within thebrowser context or within a new document based on the extracted file—andthen seamlessly add the modified document back into the portableencrypted data object either instead of or in addition to the originalfile. In some implementations, the HTML5 file may reference (e.g., use)encryption functions that are available on the device, for example,provided by the HTML5 interpreter (e.g., browser). In someimplementations, the HTML5 file may include implementation of encryptionfunctions.

As shown in step 1522, the method 1500 may optionally include revokingaccess to the file. In general, after a container has been distributed,access to the encrypted file within the container can be revoked bynotifying the key server to modify or delete an association of the tokenor the recipient with the decryption key. While this prevents federatedaccess using remote resources, the file will still generally beaccessible by using the password to internally recover and apply thedecryption key, absent additional steps to modify the container itself.This may be performed through an application running on the sender'sendpoint, or through a web interface hosted by the key server. A similareffect may be achieved by removing the token for the recipient from adatabase of the identity service, although the recipient may stillrecover the file using a local copy of the token in some circumstances.

In another aspect, the container may include logic to verify accesspermissions with the remote keystore even when decrypting locally withthe password. While somewhat less secure—communications with thekeystore may be falsified—this will provide at least one additionallayer of protection against access by casual users with access to thepassword but revoked permissions on the remote keystore.

The method described above may be realized in a host device operated bya user to create and transmit a portable encrypted data object. Thus inone aspect there is disclosed herein an endpoint comprising an interfaceto a data network, a memory storing a file, and a processor. Theprocessor may be configured, for example with computer executable code,to create a portable encrypted data object containing the file forsecure distribution over the data network by performing the steps ofreceiving a selection of a file for encryption from a user, requesting atoken uniquely identifying a recipient of the file from a firstcomputing environment to which the recipient can authenticate usingauthentication credentials, receiving the token, transmitting the tokento a remote key server, requesting an encryption key associated with thetoken from the remote key server, receiving the encryption key from theremote key server, receiving a password from the user for localdecryption of the file, encrypting the file with the encryption key tocreate an encrypted file, encrypting the encryption key to create anobject that can be decrypted using the password to recover the firstencryption key, combining the encrypted file, the object containing theencryption key, and application logic providing a user interface foraccessing the file into the portable encrypted data object, wherein theuser interface provides a first mode of accessing the file by supplyingthe password to locally decrypt the encryption key and a second mode ofaccessing the file by retrieving the encryption key from the remote keyserver.

FIG. 16 illustrates a method for enhancing perimeter security foroutbound content. In general, the techniques described above forcreating portable encrypted containers may be adapted to conditionally(e.g., pursuant to an enterprise security policy) or unconditionallysecure outbound files and other content as it leaves an endpoint. Ingeneral, this may be performed manually, e.g., with a user providing apassword and explicitly approving each outbound file, or automatically,e.g., with a firewall or the like that automatically secures outboundfiles against unauthorized access. Similarly, the code for detectingoutbound files and performing wrapping may be implemented in anelectronic mail server, proxy, client or other location for mailcommunications, or in any other network device or service applicable tooutbound communications. For example, Data Leakage Prevention (DLP)tools are commonly used to protect against improper exfiltration ofsensitive data, and may be modified to detect and control outbound filesas contemplated herein.

As shown in step 1602, the method 1600 may include receiving acommunication from a sender for communication to a recipient, thecommunication including a file coupled to the communication as anattachment. This may, for example include receiving the communication atan endpoint firewall for the sender (e.g., on the client device used bythe sender to initiate the communication), at an enterprise gateway orsimilar gateway or firewall for enterprise communications, or at anelectronic mail server used by the sender for outbound electronic mail.This may also or instead include other security devices within a datanetwork configured to monitor traffic and enforce corporate securitypolicies, as well as hosts, gateways and the like for specificcommunications protocols such as text messaging services and the like.

The communication may, for example, be an electronic mail message or atext message, and the file may be any file or similar computing objectsuch as a word processing document, a spreadsheet, an image, a video, apresentation document, a portable document format document, anapplication, an executable, a data file, and so forth.

The communication may instead include a file upload to a remote resourcesuch as a social networking platform, a web folder, a file transferprotocol server, a remote file directory, a file drop box, and so forth.Thus it should be appreciated that, as used herein, the term attachmentis also intended to include a file contained within packets of anoutbound communication such as an ftp file transfer, a file movement toa web directory or drop box, an upload to a remote service, and soforth. While the term attachment might more conventionally be associatedwith discrete communications protocols such as electronic mail or textmessaging, the principles of the invention are intended to apply to anyand all outbound communications from an endpoint that might exfiltratefiles or similar content, and all such communications may have an“attachment” as that term is used herein. One of ordinary skill in theart may readily adapt the techniques contemplated herein to these andother actions initiated on an endpoint to send a file to a recipient orotherwise communicate the file to locations outside the endpoint.

In still further embodiments, the techniques described herein may beadapted to actions initiated from the endpoint affecting a file transferbetween two other remote locations. Thus for example, a user may dragand drop a file from one remote folder to another remote folder toinitiate a file transfer for one or more files that are neverinstantiated on the endpoint. Under these circumstances, the techniquesdescribed above may still be usefully applied to ensure that the filesplaced in the destination folder are wrapped in portable encryptedcontainers. Similarly, if a user offers remote access by recipients tofiles stored in a web folder or the like, the files may be wrapped,either before access or as individual files are downloaded, in order toprotect against access by unauthorized third parties. These and othervariations will be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art.

As shown in step 1604, the method 1600 may include removing theattachment from the communication.

As shown in step 1604, the method 1500 may include encrypting thefile(s) in the attachment, to provide an encrypted instance of thefile(s). As described above, this may include securing an encryption keyand a corresponding decryption key from a remote key server and usingthe encryption key to encrypt the file. The remote key server may thenassociate the decryption key with the recipient (in response to acorresponding request from the sender) so that the decryption key can beretrieved from the remote key server with a presentation of suitablecredentials by the recipient.

As shown in step 1606, the method 1600 may include wrapping theattachment into a portable encrypted container. As described above, thiscontainer may an object that contains an encrypted instance of the file,an encrypted instance of a decryption key to decrypt the file, andprogram code providing a user interface for file access. The userinterface may support multiple modes for accessing the encrypted contentof the container. For example, the user interface may support a firstmode of decryption using remote resources (e.g., a remote key server andan identity service). The user interface may also support a second modeof decryption based on local receipt of a password for decrypting thedecryption key. In this context, wrapping the attachment may includereceiving a user input of the password for local decryption of the file,or wrapping the attachment may include automatically creating thepassword for local decryption of the file. More generally, any or all ofthe access modes described above may be incorporated into the userinterface code to support access to the contents of the container asdesired.

In general, wrapping as contemplated herein may also include applying asecurity policy such as a policy for exfiltration of files, data and thelike. Thus while wrapping may include automatic wrapping of all outboundattachments from the sender, wrapping may instead include conditionallywrapping the attachment according to a security protocol applicable tothe sender. The security protocol may temporarily or indefinitelyspecify automatic wrapping of all outbound attachments from the sender.The security protocol may also or instead specify automatic wrapping ofpredetermined file types from the sender, automatic wrapping of filesfrom predetermined origins, or automatic wrapping based on any suitableobjective critieria for, e.g., a recipient, a recipient domain, a filetype, a file location, file metadata, and so forth.

As shown in step 1608, the method 1600 may include attaching theportable encrypted container to the communication in order to resume thecommunications as originally initiated by the sender. This restores thecommunication to its original form, except with the portable encryptedcontainer in place of the original attachment.

As shown in step 1610, the method 1600 may include transmitting thecommunication and the portable encrypted container to the recipient.This may include sending an electronic mail, a text message, a filetransfer, or any of the other communications contemplated herein.

As shown in step 1612, the method 1600 may include communicating thepassword to the recipient through a second communication medium. Thismay include sending the password in a second, follow-up email or thelike. However, it may be more secure to send the password using adifferent communication medium, such as by sending the password with amobile text message (e.g., SMS) when the attachment is sent with anelectronic mail message. More generally, the second communication may bedifferent from a first communication medium bearing the communicationand the attachment. The password may also or instead be locally storedon the sender's device, e.g., in a password log or the like, or in aremote, secure resource accessible to the sender, or the password may becommunicated to the sender for archival purposes, such as within anelectronic mail or text message. In another aspect, no record is made ofthe recovery password so that the password is transitory in nature.

The foregoing method may be implemented in any of a number of networkdevices such as an endpoint, a client device operated by the sender, anenterprise gateway, an electronic mail server, and so forth. Thus in oneaspect there is disclosed herein a network device such as any of thedevices or endpoints described herein including a first interface forreceiving communications, a second interface for sending communicationsover a data network, a memory, and a processor. The processor may beconfigured by computer executable code stored in the memory to securenetwork communications by performing the steps of receiving acommunication from a sender through the first interface forcommunication to a recipient, the communication including a file coupledto the communication as an attachment, removing the attachment from thecommunication, wrapping the attachment into a portable encryptedcontainer that contains an encrypted instance of the file, an encryptedinstance of a decryption key to decrypt the file, and program codeproviding a user interface that supports a first mode of decryptionusing remote resources and authentication credentials for the recipientand a second mode of decryption based on local receipt of a password fordecrypting the decryption key, attaching the portable encryptedcontainer to the communication, and transmitting the communication andthe portable encrypted container to the recipient through the secondinterface.

FIG. 17 shows a method for intermediate encryption of potentiallyexposed content. A variety of techniques are contemplated herein formanaging encryption in order to secure data on an endpoint, such as thetechniques described above with reference to FIG. 5. While thesetechniques may advantageously protect data in various circumstances, itis also possible for encrypted data to become exposed, or potentiallyexposed in various circumstances, such as when a process opens anencrypted/protected file before the process is recognized as unsafe.Under these circumstances, it may be useful to remove the affected filesfrom an otherwise secure environment, without fully decrypting andexposing the data in the affected files. In order to achieve thisobjective, a file system may apply a temporary, intermediate encryptionstate that remains in force until an exposure or other compromisingevent can be remediated, after which the file(s) can be returned to asecure, encrypted state used for other files that are not compromised.

As shown in step 1702, the method 1700 may include providing a first keyto a process executing on an endpoint, the first key providing access toa plurality of files on the endpoint. Using this key, the process mayaccess files within a secure or protected file area, which may be afolder, a group of folders, a directory, a detachable storage, an entirehard drive, or any other file location or combination of locations. Asdescribed above, this may include controlling access to key materialthrough a mount point, file system filter, file system interface, orother file system extension or the like that applies rules andconditionally provides encryption/decryption according to securitystates and other information. The first key may more generally be anencryption or decryption key for access to files within a secureenvironment with access controlled by the file system extension. It willbe appreciated that the term “key,” as used in reference to this figure,may refer to a symmetric key, in which case the key is the same for bothencryption and decryption, or to an asymmetric key, in which case a keyincludes both an encryption key used to encrypt data and a correspondingdecryption key to decrypt the data. While the following text does notdistinguish between these key types, either type of key may be usefullyemployed with the systems and methods describe below, and either type ofkey is intended to fall within the scope of a “key” as contemplatedherein.

As shown in step 1704 the method 1700 may include detecting a potentialsecurity compromise to the endpoint. A wide range of techniques areknown in the art for detecting actual or potential security compromises,and any such techniques may be adapted for use as a detection toolincluding the various techniques described herein. For example,detecting the potential security compromise to the endpoint may includeidentifying a compromised state on the endpoint, such as by identifyingmalicious software based on static analysis or identifying malicioussoftware based on behavioral analysis. Detecting the potential securitycompromise to the endpoint may also or instead include identifying acompromised state of the process that is using the file. Detecting thepotential security compromise to the endpoint may also or insteadinclude detecting an exposure of the process to an unknown data source.Furthermore, it will be noted that the description accompanying FIG. 17refers generally to a “potential security compromise,” suggesting thatthe detection may be based, e.g., on exposure or an elevated butunconfirmed inference of malicious activity or other circumstancessuggesting a possible threat. However, the techniques described hereinmay also or instead be used in instances of actual, confirmed securitycompromises, and the phrase “potential security compromise” should beunderstood in this context to refer to potential and actual securitycompromises.

As shown in step 1706, the method 1700 may include providing a secondkey to the process different than the first key. In general, this secondkey can provide security to the potentially compromised data byprotecting the data against further unauthorized access, while stillpreventing the process that is potentially compromised from accessingadditional files or data that are secured with the first key.

As shown in step 1708, the method 1700 may include encrypting a firstone of the plurality of files that is open by the process with thesecond key.

As shown in step 1710, the method 1700 may include revoking the firstkey from the process to prevent access to other ones of the plurality offiles by the process. It will be appreciated that various levels ofcompromise may be detected and addressed with the techniquescontemplated herein. In the case of a severe compromise the first keymay be completely revoked from the endpoint. This may, for example,include deleting the first key from the endpoint so that no other filesencrypted with the first key can be accessed, and the only availablefile operations become use of files that are already open and thecreation of new files (for use with the second key). This techniqueadvantageously permits quick and effective isolation of all data that isprotected by encryption with the first key, while also permittingcontinued operation of the endpoint, where processes can continue to useany files that are currently open with the second key. As an additionalmeasure, the first key may be physically removed from the endpointusing, e.g., data shredding techniques such as overwriting to ensurethat the relevant key material cannot be recovered from physical storageon the endpoint.

As shown in step 1712, the method 1700 may include initiatingremediation of the potential security compromise. Numerous malwareremediation techniques are known in the art, and may be adapted forremediation as contemplated herein. This may, for example includepreparatory steps such as storing the first one of the plurality offiles after encryption with the second key and before initiatingremediation so that file(s) can be stored in a secure, non-volatilestate as necessary or helpful during remediation. Remediation may alsoinclude various types of user interaction. For example, a pop up,dialogue box, or other user notification feature may inform a user of apotential compromise, and notify the user of necessary steps forremediation, e.g., a restart of a process, closing of a file, restart ofa machine, or other step or combination of steps. The dialogue box mayalso offer to perform these steps for the user, or notify the user thatno new files can be opened until the remediation is performed.

As shown in step 1714, the method 1700 may include determining whetherthe remediation is successful. If the remediation is successful, thenthe method 1700 may proceed to step 1716 for a return to normal(uncompromised) operations. If the remediation is unsuccessful, then thefiles may be retained in the intermediate encryption state (with thesecond key) as shown in step 1720 until further actions can be taken.

As shown in step 1716, when a remediation successfully resolves acompromised or potentially compromised state, the method 1700 mayinclude returning the first key to the process. This may includerecovering the first key from a remote key management system orotherwise retrieving and/or restoring access to the first key by theprocess, e.g., view with a file system extension, interface, filter,mount point, or the like.

As shown in step 1718, the method 1700 may include transcribing thefirst one of the plurality of files for access using the first key. Ifthe file is in use by the process and thus in a plaintext state, thismay include encrypting the file with the first key and storing the filein this encrypted state. If the file has been closed, e.g., as a resultof normal file operations, as a precursor to remediation, or for someother reason, then the file may be decrypted using the second key andthen encrypted using the first key for return to the secure file system.In either case, this may include deleting the second key and saving thefile that is encrypted with the first key, after which the method 1700may return to normal operation (e.g., step 1702) where the (remediated)process has access to the file using the first key and new compromisesor potential compromises can be detected.

As shown in step 1720, the method 1700 may include continuing use of thesecond key unless or until the compromised state can be resolved. Asshown in step 1722, remediation efforts may be repeated, or additional,different remedial measures may be attempted where initial remediationefforts are unsuccessful. After various remediation efforts, the method1700 may return to step 1714 where an additional determination may bemade as to whether the remediation is successful.

In one aspect, there is disclosed herein a system implementing thetechniques above to control access by processes to potentiallycompromised files and data. The system may include an endpoint, a firstmemory on the endpoint storing a first key, a second memory on theendpoint storing a plurality of files encrypted by the first key, aprocess executing on a processor on the endpoint, the process using thefirst key to access a first one of the plurality of files, and asecurity agent executing on the processor and configured to detect apotential security compromise to the endpoint using any of thetechniques described above. The processor may in turn be configured torespond to the potential security compromise by encrypting the first oneof the plurality of files with a second key different from the firstkey, providing access by the process to the second key, and revoking thefirst key from the process to prevent access by the process to otherones of the plurality of files. As further describe above, the processormay be configured to initiate a remediation of the potential securitycompromise, and to respond to a successful remediation of the potentialsecurity compromise by returning the first key to the process for accessto the plurality of files.

FIG. 18 shows a method for just-in-time encryption of data. Many of thetechniques described above can be used to secure data on an endpoint byencrypting files with a key and controlling access to the key through amount point, file system filter, file system interface, or other filesystem extension as described above. However, for various reasons, suchas when a new storage device is attached or when an endpoint isinitially converted to use with these encryption techniques, there maybe files that are not yet encrypted for data protection. In thesecircumstances, it may be useful to provide for just-in-time encryptionof new files when they are first detected, for example so that a secureprocess can work with secure and unsecure files at the same time (byimmediately securing the unsecure files). The following method 1800facilitates process execution in this type of hybrid data or fileenvironment.

As shown in step 1802, the method 1800 may include encrypting aplurality of files on an endpoint with a key to provide a plurality ofencrypted files. This may, for example, use any of the techniquesdescribed herein. In general control of encryption and decryption forthis group of encrypted files may be controlled through a mount point,file system filter, file system interface, or other file systemextension as described above.

As shown in step 1804, the method 1800 may include monitoring a securitystate of the endpoint. A wide range of techniques are known in the artfor monitoring a security state, e.g., by monitoring for the presence ofmalware on an endpoint, and any such techniques may be adapted for useas a security state monitoring tool as contemplated herein. For example,monitoring the security state may include monitoring the security stateand identifying malicious software or the like with static analysis.Monitoring may also or instead include monitoring the security statewith behavioral analysis. For a suitably instrumented endpoint, e.g., anendpoint that uses coloring as described above, this may also or insteadinclude monitoring an exposure of a process to an unknown data sourcesuch as an unrecognized file, a URL of low or unknown reputation,another process executing on the endpoint that provides data to orreceives data from the process, and so forth. Monitoring may also orinstead include remotely monitoring a heartbeat of the endpoint asdescribed herein. Monitoring may also or instead include monitoringnetwork traffic originating from the endpoint at a gateway for anenterprise network that includes the endpoint. More generally, anytechniques for detecting the presence or use of malware or the like onan endpoint may be adapted to monitor an endpoint as contemplatedherein.

Monitoring the security state of the endpoint may include monitoring theendpoint generally, or monitoring specific processes such as a processthat is accessing encrypted files or a process that is accessing anunrecognized file for the first time, e.g. a file that is outside thegroup of encrypted files described above. In general, monitoring may beperformed continuously or periodically, and multiple monitoringprocesses may be executed concurrently or sequentially, and may beexecuted on some predetermined schedule or in response to other detectedor observed events on the endpoint. Furthermore, monitoring may becontinued while other steps are performed. That is, when a compromise isdetected as described below, monitoring may resume while additional,remedial steps are initiated to address the detected compromise.

As shown in step 1806, the method 1800 may include providing a key fordecryption of the files according to the security state determined instep 1804. This may for example include providing the key to a processexecuting on the endpoint whenever the security state of the endpoint isnot compromised and revoking the key from the process whenever thesecurity state of the endpoint is compromised. This control of access tothe key and encrypted content may be implemented, for example, using amount point, file system filter, file system interface, or other filesystem extension as described above. Thus the method 1800 may includeproviding access to the process by decrypting files with the key using afile system filter coupled between the process and a file system of theendpoint, or by decrypting files with the key at a mount point coupledbetween the process and a file system of the endpoint, or by decryptingfiles with the key using a file system interface interposed, forexample, between the endpoint and a file system.

If the endpoint becomes severely compromised, for example with malwaresuch as ransomware or an advanced persistent threat enabling remoteaccess and control, then the key may be revoked, e.g., from theendpoint. This may include complete revocation so that no further actioncan be taken on the encrypted files, or this may include an incrementalrevocation wherein access to open files is maintained but no additionalfiles can be opened. In another aspect, shadow copies of open files maybe created so that executing processes can continue to execute whileencrypted files are isolated from further manipulation. In one aspect,revoking the key from the endpoint may further include physicallyremoving the key from the endpoint to prevent any and all access toencrypted files. The method 1800 may also include returning the key tothe endpoint if the endpoint is remediated, such as by recovering thekey from a remote management system.

As shown in step 1810, the method 1800 may include detecting access to anew file by the process. This may, for example, be any file other thanone of the encrypted files that already been encrypted in step 1802,such as a file copied or moved from a remote directory but not yetaccessed by any process on the endpoint, or a file on the endpoint thathas not already been encrypted by a background process responsible forencrypting all of the files on the endpoint. Although not illustrated inFIG. 18, it will be appreciated that in general, where no access to anew file is detected, the method 1800 may return to step 1802 wherebackground encryption may be performed, or to step 1804 where thesecurity state of the endpoint is monitored.

As shown in step 1812, the method may include providing a key for accessto the new file according to the security state detected in step 1804.In general, this may include encrypting the new file with the keyimmediately upon access by the process if the security state of theendpoint is not compromised so that the new file can be added to theencrypted files created in step 1802. By contrast, if the security stateof the endpoint is compromised, this may include withholding the key andexcluding the new file from the encrypted files.

As shown in step 1814, a number of additional steps may be performed fora compromised endpoint. This may, for example, include remedial measuressuch as terminating a process, requesting a user to restart anapplication, restarting an endpoint, quarantining processes or files,and so forth. As described above, the new file, and any other filesopened by a process may optionally be encrypted with a second keytemporarily in order to isolate the process and files from otherencrypted files on the endpoint. After successful remediation, thesefiles may be decrypted as required and then encrypted with the key toadd them to the plurality of encrypted files created in step 1802.

An endpoint may be configured to apply the techniques described abovefor just-in-time encryption of new files that are detected on theendpoint. Thus in one aspect there is disclosed herein a systemincluding an endpoint, a first memory on the endpoint storing a key, asecond memory on the endpoint storing a plurality of files encrypted bythe key, a process executing on a processor on the endpoint, and asecurity agent executing on the processor. The security agent may beconfigured as generally described above to monitor a security state ofthe endpoint and to detect a potential security compromise of theendpoint, wherein the processor is configured to detect an access to anew file other than one of the plurality of files, and if the securitystate of the endpoint is not compromised, to encrypt the new file withthe key immediately upon access by the process to add the new file tothe plurality of files encrypted by the key. The system may also includea remote management facility configured to remotely monitor the securitystate of the endpoint based on a heartbeat received from the endpoint.The system may also or instead include an enterprise gateway configuredto remotely monitor the security state of the endpoint based on networktraffic originating from the endpoint.

FIG. 19 shows a method for the use of perimeter encryption to enforcesecurity policies at the perimeter of an enterprise network. In general,encryption keys for an enterprise network user such as a corporation orother juristic entity may be stored at a gateway so that emailattachments, web downloads, or other documents, files and attachmentscrossing the perimeter can be intercepted, decrypted, and scanned formalware or otherwise processed according to any applicable enterprisenetwork security policies. Thus, in one aspect, the method 1900described below may include a method for operating a gateway or similarperimeter device.

As shown in step 1902, the method 1900 may include storing an encryptionkey on a gateway. In general, the encryption key may include a symmetrickey, an asymmetric key pair, or any other key, key ring or other keymaterial used by an enterprise to encrypt or decrypt data. Theencryption key may be created using any suitably secure key generationtechnique including, for example, key generation techniques usingelliptic curve cryptography, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), theRivest-Shamir-Adleman cryptosystem, and so forth. The gateway may be anyperimeter device for the enterprise network. For example, the gatewaymay include an electronic mail gateway that polices mail traffic to andfrom users within the enterprise network, or the gateway may includesome other communication gateway such as an instant messaging gateway orthe like. Thus for example, the method 1900 may include storing anencryption key on the electronic mail gateway, the encryption keyassociated with users of an enterprise network. In another aspect thegateway may include an enterprise network gateway that more generallymonitors network traffic such as web activity or the like.

As shown in step 1904, the method 1900 may include receiving acommunication at the gateway. In general, the communication may includean attachment that is encrypted with an encryption key such as any ofthe encryption keys described herein.

The communication may include a text message or the communication mayinclude an electronic mail message. More generally, the communicationmay include any data communication that might usefully be transmittedbetween users or endpoints over a data network. Thus by way ofadditional non-limiting examples, the communication may include webbrowsing activity or the like originating from within the enterprisenetwork, and the attachment may include a file download or otherretrieval of content from a remote web site or other resource to anendpoint within the enterprise. Similarly, the communication may includea connection from an endpoint to a remote resource that is carryingoutbound data from the endpoint to a remote resource. In this latterinstance, the techniques contemplated herein may be particularly usefulas a data leakage prevention measure.

The attachment may be any file, document or the like that might beembedded in, attached to, or otherwise accompany a communication over adata network. By way of non-limiting examples, the attachment mayinclude at least one of a word processing document, a spreadsheet, animage, a video, a presentation document, and a portable document formatdocument.

In one example, the attachment may include an attachment to anelectronic mail, and the method 1900 may more specifically includereceiving an electronic mail communication at an electronic mailgateway, wherein the electronic mail communication includes anattachment that is encrypted with the encryption key. The electronicmail communication may include an inbound communication to a recipientwithin the enterprise network, or the electronic mail communication mayinclude an outbound communication to a recipient outside the enterprisenetwork.

As shown in step 1906, the method 1900 may include decrypting theattachment at the gateway to provide a decrypted attachment. This mayinclude decryption using any suitable key and any suitable decryptiontechnique as contemplated herein. For example, for an electronic mail,this may include decrypting the attachment at an electronic mail gatewayto provide a decrypted attachment.

As shown in step 1908, the method 1900 may include performing a securityscan on the decrypted attachment at the gateway. For example, this mayinclude performing a security scan on the decrypted attachment from anelectronic mail at an electronic mail gateway. Scanning may include anyscanning or other security analysis consistent with the securitypolicies and security measures that might be implemented for anenterprise network as contemplated herein. For example, this may includean analysis of outbound communications for possible data leakage.Similarly, this may include scanning an inbound download from a websitefor the presence of malware using, e.g., any suitable antivirus or othermalware detection techniques.

As shown in step 1910, the method 1900 may include encrypting theattachment. In general, this may include re-encrypting the attachmentusing the encryption key described above. This may also or insteadinclude encrypting the attachment using the portable encryption formatdescribed above with reference to FIG. 16. For example, where a securitypolicy requires internal data to be encrypted, the gateway may detect anoutbound attachment that is encrypted according to the internalencryption standard, and replace this outbound attachment with anattachment that is encrypted using a portable encryption format that canbe accessed by authorized, external recipients. In complementaryfashion, an inbound communication that is wrapped with a portableencryption format may be unwrapped and then encrypted for local usewithin the enterprise network using the enterprise encryption key. Itwill be appreciated that other permutations are also possible and may beusefully combined with the techniques described herein. For example, anunencrypted outbound attachment may be detected and encrypted in orderto protect against data leakage according to a network security policy.Alternatively, an outbound encrypted attachment may be decrypted and,where exfiltration of the attachment does not violate any securitypolicy for the enterprise, the attachment may be reattached to thecommunication in an unencrypted form for transmittal outside theenterprise network.

The portable encryption format described above may be usefully employedin a number of contexts for re-encryption of attachments. For example,encrypting the attachment may include wrapping a decrypted attachment ina portable encryption container that contains an encrypted instance ofthe decrypted attachment, an encrypted instance of a decryption key todecrypt the encrypted instance of the decrypted attachment, and programcode providing a user interface that supports a first mode of decryptionusing remote resources and authentication credentials for a recipient ofthe electronic mail communication and a second mode of decryption basedon local receipt of a password for decrypting the decryption key.Consistent with the other techniques contemplated herein, the method1900 may further include attaching the portable encryption container tothe communication (e.g., an electronic mail communication) in place ofthe attachment. As described above in greater detail with reference toFIG. 16, the method 1900 may include conditionally wrapping theattachment according to a security protocol applicable to a sender ofthe communication, e.g., so that the attachment will only be wrapped inthis manner under appropriate circumstances.

As shown in step 1912, the method 1900 may include routing thecommunication from the gateway based on a result of the security scan.

For example, for an electronic mail, this may include routing theelectronic mail communication from the electronic mail gateway based ona result of the security scan.

Electronic mail routing may include at least one of rejecting theelectronic mail communication at the electronic mail gateway, reroutingthe electronic mail communication to a secure recipient, and forwardingthe electronic mail communication without the attachment. Moregenerally, this may include any suitable routing or data handlingconsistent with perimeter enforcement of security policies ascontemplated herein.

In one aspect, routing may include rejecting the communication at thegateway. For example, where an outbound electronic mail contains anattachment with sensitive data, the mail may be rejected to preventpossible data leakage of secure information in violation of anenterprise security policy. Similarly, where an inbound electronic mailcontains an attachment with malware, the electronic mail may be rejectedat the gateway to prevent malware from infecting endpoints within theenterprise. In another aspect, routing the communication may includererouting the communication to a secure recipient such as to a sandboxfor detonation or to a remote threat management facility for analysis.In another aspect, routing may include forwarding the communicationwithout the attachment. For example, this may include removing theattachment from an electronic mail and forwarding the electronic mailcommunication to an intended recipient without the attachment. In thislatter instance, the electronic mail communication may be modified intransit to indicate that a potentially harmful attachment has beenremoved.

According to the above, in one aspect there is disclosed herein agateway comprising a network interface, a memory, and a processor. Theprocessor may be configured by computer executable code stored in thememory to perform the steps of storing an encryption key on a gateway,receiving a communication at the gateway, wherein the communicationincludes an attachment that is encrypted with the encryption key,decrypting the attachment at the gateway to provide a decryptedattachment, performing a security scan on the decrypted attachment atthe gateway, and routing the communication from the gateway based on aresult of the security scan.

The above systems, devices, methods, processes, and the like may berealized in hardware, software, or any combination of these suitable fora particular application. The hardware may include a general-purposecomputer and/or dedicated computing device. This includes realization inone or more microprocessors, microcontrollers, embeddedmicrocontrollers, programmable digital signal processors or otherprogrammable devices or processing circuitry, along with internal and/orexternal memory. This may also, or instead, include one or moreapplication specific integrated circuits, programmable gate arrays,programmable array logic components, or any other device or devices thatmay be configured to process electronic signals. It will further beappreciated that a realization of the processes or devices describedabove may include computer-executable code created using a structuredprogramming language such as C, an object oriented programming languagesuch as C++, or any other high-level or low-level programming language(including assembly languages, hardware description languages, anddatabase programming languages and technologies) that may be stored,compiled or interpreted to run on one of the above devices, as well asheterogeneous combinations of processors, processor architectures, orcombinations of different hardware and software. In another aspect, themethods may be embodied in systems that perform the steps thereof, andmay be distributed across devices in a number of ways. At the same time,processing may be distributed across devices such as the various systemsdescribed above, or all of the functionality may be integrated into adedicated, standalone device or other hardware. In another aspect, meansfor performing the steps associated with the processes described abovemay include any of the hardware and/or software described above. Allsuch permutations and combinations are intended to fall within the scopeof the present disclosure.

Embodiments disclosed herein may include computer program productscomprising computer-executable code or computer-usable code that, whenexecuting on one or more computing devices, performs any and/or all ofthe steps thereof. The code may be stored in a non-transitory fashion ina computer memory, which may be a memory from which the program executes(such as random access memory associated with a processor), or a storagedevice such as a disk drive, flash memory or any other optical,electromagnetic, magnetic, infrared or other device or combination ofdevices. In another aspect, any of the systems and methods describedabove may be embodied in any suitable transmission or propagation mediumcarrying computer-executable code and/or any inputs or outputs fromsame.

The elements described and depicted herein, including in flow charts andblock diagrams throughout the figures, imply logical boundaries betweenthe elements. However, according to software or hardware engineeringpractices, the depicted elements and the functions thereof may beimplemented on machines through computer executable media having aprocessor capable of executing program instructions stored thereon as amonolithic software structure, as standalone software modules, or asmodules that employ external routines, code, services, and so forth, orany combination of these, and all such implementations may be within thescope of the present disclosure. Examples of such machines may include,but may not be limited to, personal digital assistants, laptops,personal computers, mobile phones, other handheld computing devices,medical equipment, wired or wireless communication devices, transducers,chips, calculators, satellites, tablet PCs, electronic books, gadgets,electronic devices, devices having artificial intelligence, computingdevices, networking equipment, servers, routers and the like.Furthermore, the elements depicted in the flow chart and block diagramsor any other logical component may be implemented on a machine capableof executing program instructions. Thus, while the foregoing drawingsand descriptions set forth functional aspects of the disclosed systems,no particular arrangement of software for implementing these functionalaspects should be inferred from these descriptions unless explicitlystated or otherwise clear from the context. Similarly, it may beappreciated that the various steps identified and described above may bevaried, and that the order of steps may be adapted to particularapplications of the techniques disclosed herein. All such variations andmodifications are intended to fall within the scope of this disclosure.As such, the depiction and/or description of an order for various stepsshould not be understood to require a particular order of execution forthose steps, unless required by a particular application, or explicitlystated or otherwise clear from the context. Absent an explicitindication to the contrary, the disclosed steps may be modified,supplemented, omitted, and/or re-ordered without departing from thescope of this disclosure.

The method steps of the implementations described herein are intended toinclude any suitable method of causing such method steps to beperformed, consistent with the patentability of the following claims,unless a different meaning is expressly provided or otherwise clear fromthe context. So for example performing the step of X includes anysuitable method for causing another party such as a remote user, aremote processing resource (e.g., a server or cloud computer) or amachine to perform the step of X. Similarly, performing steps X, Y and Zmay include any method of directing or controlling any combination ofsuch other individuals or resources to perform steps X, Y and Z toobtain the benefit of such steps. Thus method steps of theimplementations described herein are intended to include any suitablemethod of causing one or more other parties or entities to perform thesteps, consistent with the patentability of the following claims, unlessa different meaning is expressly provided or otherwise clear from thecontext. Such parties or entities need not be under the direction orcontrol of any other party or entity, and need not be located within aparticular jurisdiction.

It will be appreciated that the methods and systems described above areset forth by way of example and not of limitation. Numerous variations,additions, omissions, and other modifications will be apparent to one ofordinary skill in the art. In addition, the order or presentation ofmethod steps in the description and drawings above is not intended torequire this order of performing the recited steps unless a particularorder is expressly required or otherwise clear from the context. Thus,while particular embodiments have been shown and described, it will beapparent to those skilled in the art that various changes andmodifications in form and details may be made therein without departingfrom the spirit and scope of this disclosure and are intended to form apart of the invention as defined by the following claims, which are tobe interpreted in the broadest sense allowable by law.

What is claimed is:
 1. A computer program product for managingcommunications through an electronic communication gateway, the computerprogram product comprising computer executable code embodied in anon-transitory memory that, when executing on the electroniccommunication gateway, performs the steps of: storing an encryption keyon the electronic communication gateway, the encryption key for a firstencryption standard associated with users of an enterprise network;receiving an electronic communication at the electronic communicationgateway, the electronic communication including an outboundcommunication to a recipient outside of the enterprise network, and theelectronic communication includes a first attachment encrypted with theencryption key associated with users on the enterprise network;decrypting the first attachment at the electronic communication gatewayto provide a decrypted attachment; performing a security scan on thedecrypted attachment at the electronic communication gateway; encryptingthe decrypted attachment with a second encryption standard to form asecond attachment, the second encryption standard different from thefirst encryption standard and accessible by the recipient outside of theenterprise network; and routing the electronic communication from theelectronic communication gateway based on a result of the security scan.2. The computer program product of claim 1, wherein routing includesforwarding the electronic communication with the second attachment tothe recipient outside of the enterprise network.
 3. The computer programproduct of claim 1, wherein routing includes rejecting the electroniccommunication at the electronic communication gateway.
 4. The computerprogram product of claim 1, wherein routing includes forwarding theelectronic communication with the second attachment.
 5. The computerprogram product of claim 1, wherein the first attachment includes atleast one of a word processing document, a spreadsheet, an image, avideo, a presentation document, and a portable document format document.6. A method comprising: receiving an electronic communication at anelectronic communication gateway, the electronic communication includingan outbound communication to a recipient outside of an enterprisenetwork, and the electronic communication includes a first attachmentencrypted with an encryption key for a first encryption standardassociated with users on the enterprise network; decrypting the firstattachment at the electronic communication gateway to provide adecrypted attachment; performing a security scan on the decryptedattachment at the electronic communication gateway; encrypting thedecrypted attachment with a second encryption standard to form a secondattachment, the second encryption standard different from the firstencryption standard and accessible by the recipient outside of theenterprise network; and routing the electronic communication from theelectronic communication gateway based on a result of the security scan.7. The method of claim 6, wherein routing includes rejecting theelectronic communication at the electronic communication gateway.
 8. Themethod of claim 6, wherein routing includes rerouting the electroniccommunication to a secure recipient.
 9. The method of claim 6, whereinrouting includes forwarding the electronic communication with the secondattachment.
 10. The method of claim 6, wherein the electroniccommunication includes a text message or an electronic mail message. 11.The method of claim 6, wherein the first attachment includes at leastone of a word processing document, a spreadsheet, an image, a video, apresentation document, and a portable document format document.
 12. Themethod of claim 6, wherein the electronic communication gateway includesan electronic mail gateway.
 13. The method of claim 6, wherein theelectronic communication gateway includes an enterprise network gatewaythat couples the enterprise network to a second network.
 14. A gatewaycomprising: a network interface; a memory; and a processor configured bycomputer executable code stored in the memory to perform the steps ofreceiving, at the gateway, a communication to a recipient outside of anenterprise network, the communication including a first attachmentencrypted with an encryption key for a first encryption standardassociated with users on the enterprise network, decrypting the firstattachment at the gateway to provide a decrypted attachment, performinga security scan on the decrypted attachment at the gateway, encryptingthe decrypted attachment with a second encryption standard to form asecond attachment, the second encryption standard different from thefirst encryption standard and accessible by the recipient outside of theenterprise network, and routing the communication from the gateway basedon a result of the security scan.
 15. The gateway of claim 14, whereinthe gateway includes at least one of an electronic mail gateway.
 16. Thegateway of claim 14, wherein the gateway includes an enterprise networkgateway that couples the enterprise network to a second network.
 17. Thegateway of claim 14, wherein routing includes rejecting thecommunication at the gateway.
 18. The gateway of claim 14, whereinrouting includes rerouting the communication to a secure recipient. 19.The gateway of claim 14, wherein routing includes forwarding thecommunication with the second attachment.
 20. The gateway of claim 14,wherein the communication includes a text message or an electronic mailmessage.